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COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITY 
COVENANTS AND THE FREEDOM OF 
CONTRACT MYTH 
 
Andrea J. Boyack* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A generation ago, only 1% of the United States population 
lived in a privately governed common-interest community 
(“CIC”).1 Today, approximately 64 million people (20% of the 
                                                          
* Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. J.D. 
(University of Virginia), M.A.L.D. (Tufts University), B.A. (Brigham Young 
University). I would like to thank Nestor Davidson, Wilson Freyermuth, Alex 
Glashausser, Michael Lewyn, David Rubenstein, and Dale Whitman for their 
comments. I am grateful for the hard work of my research assistants, Taylor 
Kramer and Cecilia Nuby, and for the patience and support of my wonderful 
family. 
1 “Common interest community” is defined by the Restatement (Third) of 
Property to be a “development or neighborhood in which individually owned 
lots or units are burdened by a servitude that imposes an obligation that cannot 
be avoided by nonuse or withdrawal (1) to pay for the use of, or contribute to 
the maintenance of, property held or enjoyed in common by the individual 
owners, or (2) to pay dues or assessments to an association that provides 
services or facilities to the common property or to the individually owned 
property, or that enforces other servitudes burdening the property in the 
development or the neighborhood.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
SERVITUDES § 1.8 (2000). Sometimes the term common interest development 
or CID is used to refer to the same thing. CICs include condominiums and 
homeowner associations, also known as PUDs (planned unit developments). 
While structured differently, cooperative ownership developments are often 
included within the rubric of CIC. The Community Associations Institute 
(CAI) is a trade association representing all CICs nationwide. According to 
CAI, approximately 2 million out of a population of 203 million people (0.9%) 
in 1970 resided in a CIC. Industry Data, CMTY. ASS’NS INST., 
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country’s population) reside in one of the more than 300,000 
CICs in the United States.2 Residents in CICs are bound to a 
private governance scheme that includes written obligations that 
have been recorded in the local land records and run with the 
land as well as rules and regulations enacted from time to time by 
the board of directors of the community association.3 These 
covenants and rules form the private law of the community, and 
generally courts will grant injunctions or specific performance to 
enforce such regulations. State law also permits a CIC association 
to assess lien-backed fines for non-compliance.4 Buyers of homes 
in a CIC are deemed to have voluntarily elected to be legally 
bound to all the private community rules, to have such rules 
                                                          
http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 
12, 2014).  
2 CAI tracks data regarding the number of CICs and their residents. 
CMTY. ASS’NS INST., INDUSTRY DATA, http://www.caionline.org/info/ 
research/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). CAI’s data indicates 
that the number of residents of common interest communities has increased to 
63.4 million today. This figure represents 20.2% of the population of the 
U.S.A., estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2012 to be approximately 
313.9 million. U.S. & World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). The percentage 
of the population residing in a CIC continues to grow. WAYNE S. HYATT & 
SUSAN F. FRENCH, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES 3 (2d ed. 2008); Andrea J. Boyack, 
Community Collateral Damage: A Question of Priorities, 43 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 53, 58 (2011) [hereinafter Boyack, Community Collateral Damage]. The 
proliferation of the CIC form is not uniformly heralded as a positive 
development. See David E. Grassmick, Minding the Neighbor’s Business: Just 
How Far Can Condominium Owners’ Associations Go in Deciding Who Can 
Move into the Building?, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 189 (asserting that in a 
sort of “Gresham’s Law” (bad money drives out good) a “condominium or 
owners’ association-governed community is crowding out other types of 
housing from the market”). 
3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 6.4, 6.7, 6.16 (2000); 
see also HYATT & FRENCH supra note 2, at 95–104 (discussing the power of an 
association to enact rules governing the community).  
4 See WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION 
PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW 105, 121 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing 
assessments and other collection devices). 
2014.04.25 BOYACK.DOCX 5/19/2014  11:27 AM 
 COMMUNITY COVENANT CONTRACT MYTH 769 
 
specifically enforced, and to subject their property to a security 
interest securing their obligations to the community. 
For the most part, courts do not undertake a substantive 
analysis of the desirability of individual community covenants.5 
Courts reason that all members of a community have agreed to be 
contractually bound to this private governance scheme,6 and 
therefore judicial deference to community choices is mandated by 
freedom of contract policies.7 The proper judicial role, under this 
conception of the CIC, is to ensure that any changes to the private 
legislative content (covenant amendments or rule enactments) 
occur according to the privately enumerated process.8 Focusing 
                                                          
5 For example, the court in Powell v. Washburn, 125 P.3d 373, 376 
(Ariz. 2006), enjoined a homeowner from keeping a recreational vehicle on his 
property by holding that CIC covenants should be enforceable according to the 
intent of the drafting party, specifically departing from and rejecting the rule 
of strict construction of covenants that run with the land. See also Jeffrey A. 
Goldberg, Note, Community Association Use Restrictions: Applying the 
Business Judgment Doctrine, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 653, 673; (1998); Robert 
G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and “Reasonableness” in Private Law: The 
Special Case of the Property Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 45–47 
(1990).    
6 Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639–40 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (asserting that CIC restrictions “are clothed with a very 
strong presumption of validity which arises from the fact that each individual 
unit owner purchases his unit knowing of and accepting the restrictions to be 
imposed”); see also, e.g., Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ 
Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 74 (Colo. App. 1993); Joslin v. 
Pine River Dev. Corp., 367 A.2d 599, 601 (N.H. 1976).  
7 Courts reason that while a community’s group preferences may not 
coincide with individual owner preferences, those owners have agreed to 
subordinate their individual wishes to the choices of a group. This concept, 
that the interrelationship among owners in a CIC justifies some curtailment of 
individual rights, is a fundamentally accepted aspect of CIC covenant 
enforcement. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181–
82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (“[T]o promote the health, happiness, and peace 
of mind of the majority of the unit owners since they are living in such close 
proximity and using facilities in common, each unit owner must give up a 
certain degree of freedom of choice which he might otherwise enjoy in 
separate, privately owned property.”).  
8 If regulations and amendments apply equally to all members and are 
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solely on how covenants are amended and how rules are enacted 
does ensure that community members enjoy some level of 
procedural due process with respect to changes to CIC governing 
provisions. However, there is little actual substantive limit on the 
covenants and regulations that CICs can impose, either through 
amendment or as part of the original recorded covenants and 
community rules.  
Courts unrealistically presume that purchasing property within 
a CIC is in itself an adequate manifestation of assent to be bound 
to CIC governing provisions. General deference to parties’ 
substantive choices in contracting is proper. But freedom of 
contract is an inadequate justification for covenant enforcement in 
the context of privately governed communities. Such covenants 
do not necessarily represent voluntary owner assent to obligation 
and do not necessarily reflect neighborhood preferences. The 
covenants are perpetual, non-negotiable contracts of adhesion, 
bundled with one of the most personal, expensive, and 
complicated purchases an individual will ever make—the 
purchase of a home.9 As servitudes, CIC covenants enjoy 
duration and specific enforceability that go beyond typical 
contract rights.10 In addition, the terms of a community’s laws are 
not self-imposed; instead, they are crafted by developers and 
driven by the requirements of lenders and governments.11 The 
only escape from a given CIC governance scheme is sale of one’s 
                                                          
promulgated according to the procedures set forth in the governing documents, 
courts will generally uphold them. HYATT, supra note 4, at 56, 173. See, e.g., 
Kroop v. Caravelle Condo, Inc., 323 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) 
(holding that amendments severely limiting an owner’s right to lease his unit 
were valid because the amendment was passed according to the procedure set 
forth in the CIC declaration). 
9 See infra Part II.A. 
10 See infra Part II.B; see also Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom 
of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 
615, 617 (1985) (explaining the “difficult questions of intergenerational 
fairness” that arise in the context of CIC restraints). 
11 See infra Part II.D. The content of CIC covenants is motivated in part 
by mortgage market constraints imposed by federal agencies or Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac.  
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home,12 and in some markets even this will be ineffective due to 
lack of real choice among residential neighborhood options.13  
Contract analogy should not create presumptive validity for 
all CIC covenants and properly enacted rules. The reality of CIC 
governance is more complicated and implicates property and 
constitutional concerns as well as contract law. The proper 
approach to CIC governance review must draw from all three of 
these areas of the law. The subject matter scope of CIC 
governance should be limited based on servitude law principles. 
Constitutional protections should be legislated for members of 
CICs. And bona fide, deliberate assent should be prerequisite to 
holding owners bound to CIC obligations. 
Part I of this Article explores the origins and judicial 
treatment of the private laws of self-governed communities. CIC 
covenants are legal hybrids—enforced as contracts but specifically 
enforceable against successive landowners because they are 
servitudes. Part II explains how CIC covenants and rules diverge 
from the typical contractual model. CIC covenants are contracts 
of adhesion, made up of completely non-negotiable, recorded 
terms bundled into home acquisition. Developers and lenders 
generally prescribe the content of such covenants, and they may 
not reflect community desires or values. Part III explains how a 
refocused freedom of contract rationale, an updated variant of 
traditional servitude requirements, and new legislation regarding 
important personal freedoms can bring clarity and fairness to 
common interest community law.  
 
I. THE CURIOUS CASE OF COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES  
 
A. Legal Hybrids: Contracts Enforced as Servitudes and 
Functioning as Constitutions 
 
CICs are creatures both of property law and of contracts. In 
terms of function, they are akin to “mini governments.”14 The 
                                                          
12 See infra Part II.C. 
13 See infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
14 Wayne S. Hyatt & James B. Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the 
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foundational structure of CICs, however, is servitude law.15 In a 
CIC, all property owners are bound together under a system of 
real covenants and share certain financial obligations and property 
rights.16 Every property owner within a CIC is also a mandatory 
member of a contractually defined association that provides 
private governance for the community.17 The power of an 
association to govern, to assess owners for upkeep, and to 
enforce rules regarding use and appearance of individual 
properties is established through a recorded declaration of 
covenants (sometimes called CC&Rs). These covenants bind all 
successive owners of the property by virtue of their ownership, a 
concept called “running with the land.” Although framed much 
like a multilateral contract, CIC covenants transcend typical 
contractual obligation and become obligations of the property 
itself, binding its successive owners and specifically enforceable 
                                                          
Development and Administration of Condominium and Home Owners 
Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 918 (1976) (explaining that a 
CIC association is a “quasi government entity, paralleling in almost every case 
the powers, duties, and responsibilities of a municipal government”); see also 
David L. Callies & Adrienne I. Suarez, Privatization and the Providing of 
Public Facilities Through Private Means, 21 J.L. & POL. 477, 499 (2005) 
(explaining how courts have used the “mini-government theory” to justify 
implying assessment powers where governing documents failed to explicitly so 
provide). 
15 A servitude is a legal device that creates a right or obligation that runs 
with the land. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1(1). A 
servitude can be an easement, profit, or covenant. Id. § 1.1(2). The 
Restatement calls covenants that are servitudes “covenants running with the 
land.” Id. § 1.3. Modern courts do not distinguish between equitable and real 
covenants. Lake Limerick Country Club v. Hunt Mfg. Homes, Inc., 84 P.3d 
295, 298–99 (Wash. App. 2004). In this article, I use both “covenant” and 
“real covenant” to refer to covenants running with the land. 
16 See Boyack, Community Collateral Damage, supra note 2, at 60 (“All 
types of CICs . . . share the same essential service and payment structure: 
homeowner-elected directors manage common upkeep, and all homeowners 
contribute their pro rata portion of the common costs.”); see also HYATT & 
FRENCH, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing the power of an elected board of 
directors); HYATT, supra note 4, at 84–88, 105, 121 (discussing powers of a 
board, community assessments, and collection devices).  
17 HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 2, at 6, 13–14. 
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in perpetuity.18 The covenant obligations in CICs are not static 
because the association can amend the CC&Rs or pass rules to 
further clarify or carry out the purposes of the community.19 
In addition to recorded covenants contained in a community’s 
CC&Rs, the board of the community association can pass specific 
regulations authorized by the recorded declaration. These 
regulations can be changed as the board sees fit. CIC obligations 
can therefore arise either from the terms of the original recorded 
declaration, from amendments to the declaration, or from the 
rules promulgated by the board of directors to carry out the 
general purposes of the association.20 Courts generally are more 
deferential to recorded covenants than to rules enacted by the 
board, reasoning that owners had more notice of recorded 
covenants and that such covenants are not as easily changed.21 In 
addition, state statutes sometimes limit the ability of a board to 
promulgate rules governing individually owned property (as 
opposed to common elements) and individuals’ behavior.22 
                                                          
18 Any associated financial obligations are secured by a lien on the subject 
property. HYATT, supra note 4, at 120–21. 
19 CIC purposes are almost always defined as preserving and promoting 
property values and owner “lifestyle.” Apple II Condo. Ass’n v. Worth Bank 
& Trust Co., 659 N.E.2d 93, 95–97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); see also Ngai 
Pindell, Home Sweet Home? The Efficacy of Rental Restrictions to Promote 
Neighborhood Stability, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 41, 43–46 (2009); 
Zachary M. Rawling, Reevaluating Leasing Restrictions in Community 
Associations: Rejecting Reasonableness in Favor of Consent, 5 J.L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 223, 224–25 (2009). 
20 HYATT, supra note 4, at 82–88 (discussing the powers of a board of 
directors of a CIC association); see also Todd Brower, Communities Within 
the Community: Consent, Constitutionalism, and Other Failures of Legal 
Theory in Residential Associations, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 242 
(1992) (noting that CIC enforcement is justified based on the unanimous assent 
of its members to covenant terms and explaining that later amendments “pose 
special problems”). 
21 Id. at 50–51; Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Assn., 878 P.2d 
1275, 1283 (Cal. 1994). 
22 UNIFORM COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-102 (1994) 
[hereinafter UCIOA]; HYATT, supra note 4, at 52; see also Buddin v. Golden 
Bay Manor, Inc., 585 So. 2d 435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (declaring a 
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Occasionally, public policy provides a substantive outer limit 
on restrictive covenants. For example, in a handful of cases, a 
non-compete covenant or a restriction on alienation has been 
declared unenforceable as contravening public policy.23 Aside 
from such outlier cases, however, courts today will generally 
enforce covenant obligations that have something to do with the 
property as long as the obligations have been created by an 
intentional, recorded writing.24 This is different than in the past. 
Traditionally, in order for landowners to create a real covenant, 
the covenant must be in writing, specifically intended to run with 
the land, touch and concern the real property, be adequately 
publicized (usually by recordation in the applicable local land 
records in order to create third party notice), and be authored by 
parties who were linked in “horizontal privity.”25 Modernly, 
courts have moved away from strictly requiring these elements 
exist in order for a covenant to have been created. The newer 
approach relies on an intentional, recorded writing alone, 
focusing on upholding as a servitude any provision specifically 
intended to be a servitude. This approach dispenses with the 
                                                          
board rulemaking ultra vires).  
23 See, e.g., Davidson Bros., Inc. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc., 579 A.2d 288 
(N.J. 1990) (striking down a covenant not to compete for a grocery store 
property); Riste v. E. Washington Bible Camp, Inc., 605 P.2d 1294 (Wash. 
App. 1980) (striking down a restriction on conveying property without church 
approval).  
24 E.g., Powell v. Washburn, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (Ariz. 2006); Vulcan 
Materials Co. v. Miller, 691 So. 2d 908, 913 (Miss. 1997); Runyon v. Paley, 
416 S.E.2d 177 (N.C. 1992). The requirement that a covenant “touch and 
concern” the land requires that the substance of the covenant relate to the real 
property itself. By requiring that a covenant touch and concern the land in 
order to run with the land, the common law sought to ensure that personal 
obligations unrelated to the ownership of the property would only bind the 
original parties—in contract—and would not be deemed servitudes that would 
continue as specifically enforceable obligations for all landowners. 
25 RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 537 cmt. h (1944) (justifying the touch and 
concern requirement as a means to reduce the number of permissible real 
covenants). “Horizontal privity” requires both parties to simultaneously hold 
an interest in the same property, such as a landlord and tenant or buyer and 
seller. Neighbors, for example, would not be in horizontal privity. 
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formalistic requirement of privity and, to some extent, the touch 
and concern test.26  
Most of the requirements for covenant creation deal with 
required formalities, but the touch and concern requirement—to 
the extent it still exists—has to do with substance and limits the 
scope of perpetually restraining covenants.27 For example, 
traditionally, a promise to pay money could not be a covenant 
obligation as it was considered not to touch and concern the land. 
But courts eventually accepted that the assessment of property to 
pay for joint amenities was a proper subject matter for real 
covenants,28 and it was this expansion of the notion of touch and 
concern that spurred growth of suburban planned communities 
across the country.29 In the past several decades, the touch and 
                                                          
26 Courts adopting the new Restatement of Property approach no longer 
closely examine concepts of privity and touch and concern in order to deny 
servitude enforcement. E.g., Oliver v. Schultz, 885 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Ky. 
1994); Matter of Parcel of Land Located on Geneva Lake, Town of Linn, 
Walworth Cnty., 477 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 2.1, 3.1, and 3.7 (2000). Some scholars 
likewise argue that the touch and concern test is unnecessary. See Richard A. 
Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1353, 1359–60 (1982) [hereinafter Epstein, Notice and Freedom of 
Contract]. The approach of the Restatement (Third) is still controversial and 
several jurisdictions have refused to embrace its approach. E.g., Nickerson v. 
Green Valley Recreation, Inc., 265 P.3d 1108, 1115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011); 
Regency Homes Ass’n v. Egermayer, 498 N.W.2d 783, 791 (Neb. 1993). For 
an example of the rare case of a court finding that a covenant does not touch 
and concern the land and therefore does not run with the land, see Ebbe v. 
Senior Estates Golf & Country Club, 657 P.2d 696 (Or. App. 1983). See also 
supra note 24. 
27 Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy 
Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. 
L. REV. 433, 449 (1984) [hereinafter Korngold, Privately Held Conservation 
Servitudes]. See also RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 537 cmt. h (1944) (justifying 
the  requirement as a means to reduce the number of permissible real 
covenants).  
28 See, e.g., Regency Homes Ass’n v. Egermayer, 498 N.W.2d 783 
(Neb. 1993); Neponsit Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Emigrant 
Industrial Savings Bank, 278 N.Y. 248 (1930).  
29 EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE 
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concern requirement has faded in importance. The new 
Restatement calls it unnecessary. But without the touch and 
concern requirement, covenants have no substantive limits 
beyond the public policy restraints placed on all contracts.   
The legality of CIC governance crystallized during the last 
century.30 But the outer boundary of permissible subject matter 
for CIC regulation remains the subject of heated debate.31 As 
courts over the past century began to take a more permissive view 
toward CICs and associated covenant requirements, developers 
increasingly structured communities with common amenities and 
assessment obligation servitudes, confident that courts would 
uphold the governance scheme. In the twentieth century, 
community real estate development became a big part of the real 
estate industry. Developers pioneered using servitude law to 
achieve their visions of community planning and design. At first, 
developers relied on restrictive covenants to limit land uses as a 
                                                          
RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 31–32 (1996). 
30 Although the modern CIC did not appear until the 1970s, the 
underlying legal forms that make CICs possible can be traced back to the 
sixteenth century’s breakdown of the English common field system. The 
Industrial Revolution heralded changes in land use that increased potential 
negative externalities on neighbors. Property law expanded the law of 
servitudes as an adaptation to these new developments. Id.; see also JESSE 
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 668–70 (5th ed. 2002). Initially 
courts were worried that this ownership structure would negatively impact 
alienability. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Ulrich, 34 N.E. 556 (Ill. 1893) (holding 
that since limitations on free alienability are disfavored at law, ambiguities are 
to be resolved against the restrictive covenants); Carol M. Rose, Property Law 
and the Rise, Life, and Demise of Racially Restrictive Covenants (Ariz. Legal 
Studies Discussion Paper No.13-21, 2013), reprinted in POWELL ON REAL 
PROPERTY (Michael Allan Wolf & Richard R. Powell, eds., 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2243028. Initially, courts were concerned that 
enforcing this new brand of servitude would adversely affect alienability of 
land. MCKENZIE, supra note 29, at 32. 
31 See, e.g., Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An 
Introductory Survey, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 293–94 (1976) (advocating a 
robust “touch and concern” test as a way of limiting the scope of permissible 
CIC regulations); Brower, supra note 20, at 272–73 (advancing a theory that 
presumptive enforceability of CIC covenants should turn on the extent of the 
particular liberty right curtailed). 
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way to preserve values, particularly for affluent suburban 
communities.32 Many early generation covenant communities 
were created by obtaining the unanimous consent of all 
neighborhood residents, and these covenants focused on 
restricting undesirable uses33 and users.34  
In the 1960s and the 1970s, there was a further revolution in 
CIC ownership form through the increased use of condominiums. 
During this time, new developments increasingly were structured 
as privately governed communities prior to sale of the first unit, 
and in these communities owner assent was presumed through 
purchase of property already burdened with CC&Rs. Although 
the cooperative form had previously been used to approximate 
real property ownership of a unit in a multi-family building,35 in 
the 1960s, actual fee simple property ownership of apartment 
units was made possible by the enactment of condominium-
                                                          
32 Neponsit, 15 N.E.2d at 793.  
33 Community covenants are very useful in addressing negative external 
impacts that the use of one parcel imposes upon other proximate parcels, and 
are preferable to reliance on nuisance law to protect property from such 
negative externalities. See Andrea J. Boyack, Community Covenant Alienation 
Restraints and the Hazard of Unbounded Servitudes, 42 REAL ESTATE L.J. 450 
(2013) [hereinafter Boyack, Community Covenant Alienation Restraints].  
34 “Occupancy restrictions perhaps were the raison d’être of early-
generation covenant-based communities.” Id.; see also Grassmick, supra note 
2; LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND 
PROPERTY LINES 123 (2009). For a thorough discussion and analysis of 
historic racial occupancy restrictions in CICs, see RICHARD R.W. BROOKS & 
CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE 
COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS (2013). 
35 The cooperative ownership structure allowed shareholders of an owning 
entity to obtain exclusive, perpetual possessory rights with respect to a single 
apartment unit. Cooperatives are generally included in the definition of CICs 
even though their ownership form is based on lease and corporate law. 
Cooperatives, often known as co-ops, are more commonly found in earlier 
urbanized areas, such as New York City. Susan Stellin, Co-op vs. Condo: The 
Differences Are Narrowing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2012, at RE9. Cooperative 
buildings do not permit fee simple ownership of a given unit, instead, the 
entire building is owned by an entity, and each “owner” holds a share of 
membership interest in the entity. The shareholders have, as an appurtenance 
to their ownership interests, a perpetual lease on “their” unit. 
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enabling statutes.36 By the 1970s, every state had adopted a 
statute specifically permitting condominium ownership.37 In 1977, 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws began drafting the Uniform Condominium Act based on the 
1974 Virginia model. Subsequently, the Conference prepared 
uniform laws governing the three forms of CICs (condominiums, 
cooperatives, and homeowners associations) and combined the 
resulting three acts into the Uniform Common Interest Ownership 
Act (UCIOA).38 To date, eight states have adopted the UCIOA.39 
                                                          
36 The Condominium is a creature of statute that permits fee simple 
ownership defined along three-dimensional planes, rather than common law 
two-dimensionally defined land ownership boundaries. In the common law, the 
third dimension is ad coelom: a column of space “from the center of the earth 
to the heavens.” See William Schwartz, Condominium: A Hybrid Castle in the 
Sky, 44 B.U. L. REV. 137, 141 (1964) (noting the traditional view that 
“whatever is attached to the land belongs to the land” and, consequently, to the 
person who owns the land itself); Charles W. Pittman, Note, Land Without 
Earth—The Condominium, 15 U. FLA. L.  REV. 203, 205–06 (1962) (noting 
the general hostility expressed in European civil codes to the concept of 
horizontal property). Condominium ownership is the only way to own an 
apartment in fee simple. The earliest state condominium statutes tracked the 
FHA Model Act and in some key aspects were insufficient, ambiguous and 
ineffective. See Robert Kratovil, The Declaration of Restrictions, Easements, 
Liens, and Covenants: An Overview of an Important Document, 22 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 69 (1988). Once condominium-enabling statutes were 
passed in the early 1970s, condominium ownership of apartments rapidly 
replaced the cooperative form as the most common way to obtain “ownership” 
of an apartment unit. The condominium ownership structure made ownership 
of urban apartment dwelling units possible and has proved so flexible that 
today fee simple ownership can exist with respect to “postage stamp” buildings 
(the outlines of the building alone without any surrounding land), parking 
spaces, interior store spaces, and even air space for telecommunications 
equipment. 
37 Every state adopted a condominium statute in the 1960s, and this paved 
the way for a huge condominium “boom” during the next few decades. 
HYATT, supra note 4, at 11.  
38
 UCIOA, supra note 22. The UCIOA was created by combining the 
Uniform Condominium Act, the Uniform Planned Community Act, and the 
Model Real Estate Cooperative Act.  
39 Boyack, Community Collateral Damage, supra note 2, at 100.  
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Other states have retained their early condominium statutes or 
have made updates thereto but have not adopted the uniform 
statute.40  
Three similar but legally distinct ownership structures fall 
under the CIC rubric. In planned unit development, individual 
owners hold title to lots and are members of an association that 
owns common property. The condominium association, in 
contrast, does not own any property. In condominiums, owners 
hold fee simple title to their unit and are tenants in common with 
all other unit owners with respect to common property. All 
property in a cooperative is owned by an association, and all 
“owners” are shareholders of that association as well as tenants 
under a perpetual lease with respect to their unit. Although the 
legal structure of ownership among the three forms of CICs 
differs,41 all CICs allow buyers to obtain amenities that they could 
not otherwise afford individually, and owners of any property 
within a community are automatically members of the CIC—there 
is no opt out. 
The possibility for shared private contribution to the costs of 
community amenities and upkeep through CIC ownership 
structures proved popular with local governments.  Municipalities 
quickly perceived the benefit of creating taxable housing that 
provided its own community maintenance framework (including 
                                                          
40 Id.  
41 In condominium ownership, every member owns her unit in fee simple 
and all members collectively hold the remainder of the condominium (the roof, 
lobby, elevators, amenities, parking garage, electrical system, etc.) as tenants 
in common. PUD development is similar to condominiums, but typically the 
lot owners do not own common areas as tenants in common; instead, the 
association owns the common areas. In all three forms of CICs, property 
ownership is synonymous with membership in the governing association, and 
in all three ownership forms, members must abide by recorded covenants and 
rules established by the association’s board. The association is responsible for 
maintenance of the CIC and is funded in full by assessments levied on the 
members. The obligation to pay assessments is secured by a lien on the real 
property owned by the member. See generally HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 
2; Boyack, Community Collateral Damage, supra note 2.  
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snow removal, paving, and in some cases even fire and safety).42 
Because of this ability to privatize public function, local 
governments have actively encouraged the spread of CIC form as 
a way to privately finance community services.43  Municipalities 
have even required new residential developments to be structured 
as CICs in order to generate revenue rather than as non-CICs 
which demand more municipally funded infrastructure and 
upkeep.44 The governmental budgetary motive for encouraging 
private CIC structuring reflects demands for lower property 
taxes.45 On the other hand, as municipalities push for CIC 
structuring, buyers who specifically would like to live outside a 
CIC may be unable to find non-CIC housing. In addition, owners 
in CICs effectively are taxed twice—once through municipal 
                                                          
42 See CLIFFORD TREESE ET AL., RESEARCH INST. FOR HOUS. AM., 
CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION MORTGAGE 
UNDERWRITING AND CREDIT ANALYSIS 6 (2001), available at http://www. 
housingamerica.org/RIHA/RIHA/Publications/48502_ChangingPerspectiveson
CommunityAssociationMortgageUnderwriting.pdf (stating that government 
privatizes its functions, requiring community associations to fulfill an 
otherwise municipal obligation); see also HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 2, at 
13–14 (explaining how CICs function like local governments); Boyack, 
Community Collateral Damage, supra note 2, at 121 (comparing the function 
of associations to that of local governments and comparing association 
assessments to property taxes).  
43 Susan F. French, Making Common Interest Communities Work: The 
Next Step, 37 URB. LAW. 359 (2005). 
44 TREESE ET AL., supra note 42, at 3 (discussing methods that 
communities utilize to minimize taxes); Boyack, Community Collateral 
Damage, supra note 2, at 60 (“The CIC structure enables more community 
amenities and upkeep, permitting neighborhoods to self-fund and allowing 
local governments to avoid raising taxes in response to more housing 
developments.”). 
45 In California, Proposition 13 limited municipal ability to increase 
property taxes to meet demand for community services, and CIC governance 
was a way to provide community amenities without draining tax revenue. The 
trend away from property tax funded amenities is self-perpetuating because 
residents in CICs, who have to pay community assessments in addition to 
property taxes, are strong and local voting blocks against property tax 
increases. Callies & Suarez, supra note 14, at 493. 
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property taxes and once through CIC assessments.46 
On balance, the innovation of the CIC is a positive 
development. CIC structures have led to increased home 
ownership in the United States. CICs also address the problem of 
neighborhood nuisances47 and increase available neighborhood 
amenities.48 Still, CIC jurisprudence shows troubling claims of 
overreaching by association governments and the enforcement of 
abusive covenants.49 Some scholars bemoan the erosion of 
                                                          
46 In one state, New Jersey, taxpayers have successfully claimed the right 
to offset a portion of their community assessments from property taxes, 
claiming that they were penalized by double taxation without this offset. 
HYATT, supra note 4, at 133 (citing Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Estate of 
Allison, 174 A.2d 631, 640 (N.J. Super Ct. 1961) (reasoning that a property’s 
true value does not include the value of rights transferred to a community)). 
Other than in New Jersey, however, assessments are not deductible from tax 
impositions. Id. at 106. 
47  In situations where neighbors do not have community covenants, or 
where covenants do not explicitly prohibit an objectionable activity, neighbors 
can claim that the objectionable activity should be proscribed as a nuisance. 
Relying on the tort of nuisance to prohibit uses of neighboring property, 
however, is unpredictable, inconsistent, and often ineffective. For example, In 
Turudic v. Stephens, an Oregon court found that keeping two “pet” cougars in 
a residential neighborhood did not constitute a nuisance. 31 P.3d 465 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2001). On the other hand, courts routinely limit uses of property based 
on restrictions in a community’s CC&Rs without requiring that the use be 
proven to be a nuisance. See, e.g., Laumbauch v. Westgate, C.A. No. 2442-
VCS, 2008 WL 3846419 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008), aff'd, 966 A.2d 349 (Del. 
2009). 
48 See Boyack, Community Covenant Alienation Restraints, supra note 
33; Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829; 
French, supra note 43. 
49  See, e.g., Note, The Rule of Law in Residential Associations, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 472, 473 (1985) (explaining the potential for CICs to become 
“illiberal communities,” namely “communities that repudiate norms embodied 
in traditional civil rights”); Kristina Caffrey, The House of the Rising Sun: 
Homeowners' Associations, Restrictive Covenants, Solar Panels, and the 
Contract Clause, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 721, 738 (2010) (explaining how 
“faction abuse and tyranny of the majority” prevents CICs from adequately 
resolving issues regarding solar panels); Jeffrey A. Goldberg, Community 
Association Use Restrictions: Applying the Business Judgment Doctrine, 64 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 653, 670 (1988) (explaining that CIC boards have 
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personal freedom, property rights, and neighborhood diversity 
that has resulted from the proliferation of the CIC ownership 
model.50  
 
B. Judicial Oversight of CIC Governance 
 
The CIC phenomenon is impacted by an array of legal 
disciplines, including association governance, constitutional 
rights, and property law. But more and more, courts have 
conceived of CIC governing provisions under the rubric of 
contract jurisprudence. The rhetoric of freedom of contract is 
often used as the primary justification for upholding CIC 
regulations and restrictions.51 The reality of how parties become 
obligated to CIC covenants and board-enacted rules, however, 
calls into question just how appropriate and far-reaching freedom 
of contract rationale is in the CIC context. 
Courts have struggled with the best way to characterize CIC 
covenants and rules, but for all courts, the analysis of CIC 
                                                          
enormous power and thus enormous potential for abuse of that power); Robert 
C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 
1531 (1982) (explaining how wealth redistribution and other economic abuses 
of power can impose “victimization costs” on dissenting owners in a CIC); 
Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 
U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 275 (1976) (explaining how personal biases may lead to 
governing power abuse in CICs). Even in upholding CIC governing acts, the 
Nahrstedt court cautioned that “[b]ecause of its considerable power in 
managing and regulating a common interest development, the governing board 
of an owners association must guard against the potential for the abuse of that 
power. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Assn., 878 P.2d 1275, 1281–82 
(Cal. 1994). Professor Stewart Sterk suggests, however, that the democratic 
basis of association governance provides a built-in protection against abuse of 
power by a CIC board. Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection in Residential 
Private Governments, 77 B.U. L. REV. 273, 341 (1997). 
50 E.g., MCKENZIE, supra note 29; Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegel, 
Trust and Community: The Common Interest Community as Metaphor and 
Paradox, 72 MO. L. REV. 1111 (2007). 
51 E.g., Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1286; Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 
393 So. 2d 637, 639–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Apple II Condo. Ass’n v. 
Worth Bank & Trust, 659 N.E. 2d at 93, 96 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
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regulation validity starts with the foundational assumption that 
owners voluntarily obligate themselves to CIC governance when 
they buy into the community. Based on this presumption, courts 
explain that owners voluntarily agreed to relinquish “a certain 
degree of freedom of choice” when they became members of the 
CIC.52 Therefore, the covenants and properly enacted rules are 
presumptively binding as contract terms. In particular, provisions 
of the recorded declaration as of the date of an owner’s purchase 
are presumptively binding unless the provisions violate public 
policy.53  
Theoretically, a court may strike down CIC covenants based 
on finding that they infringe upon members’ “constitutional 
rights.”54 But constitutional violations must involve state action, 
and this is a difficult hurdle to overcome in the context of CIC 
associations.55 Sometimes disgruntled owners claim that an 
association’s power is restrained by state or federal constitutions 
based on an expansive conception of state action. For example, 
one theory—made in reference to the 1944 Supreme Court case of 
                                                          
52 HYATT, supra note 4, at 50–51 (explaining how widely cited this 
foundational assumption is); see also Basso, 393 So. 2d at 637.  
53 Public policy limits the substance of covenants in the same way that 
pubic policy limits the substance of contracts. For example, some covenants 
not to compete have been held unenforceable as a matter of public policy. 
Davidson Bros., Inc. v. Katz & Sons, Inc., 579 A.2d 288 (N.J. 1990). 
Theoretically, public policy should also restrain covenants that unduly limit 
alienation of real property. See, e.g., Riste v. E. Wash. Bible Camp, Inc., 605 
P.2d 1294 (Wash Ct. App. 1980). 
54 See HYATT, supra note 4, at 62–63. The standard for review is whether 
any category one restriction is wholly arbitrary, in violation of public policy or 
an individual’s constitutional rights. Pines of Boca Barwood Condo. Ass’n v. 
Cavouti, 605 So. 2d 984, 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
55 There must be “state action” to enforce constitutional rights. Comm. 
For A Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 929 A.2d 
1060, 1067 (N.J. 2007); see also HYATT, supra note 4, at 62–63. For 
example, one court specifically explained that a covenant limiting occupancy 
that would violate constitutional rights if created by the local government 
through a zoning ordinance did not create a constitutional problem because it 
was privately enacted. See White Egret Condo., Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 
346, 349 (Fla. 1979). 
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Shelley v. Kraemer—is that even if acts by an association are not 
themselves state action, state action exists when a court enforces 
such governance acts, and it is this judicial state action that 
renders the covenant’s substance vulnerable to constitutional 
scrutiny.56 Most courts, however, decline to apply Shelley outside 
the private racial zoning context.57 Another theory, made in 
reference to the 1946 Supreme Court case of Marsh v. Alabama, 
posits that CICs are the functional equivalent of local 
governments and should therefore be bound to the same 
constitutional constraints.58 However, this theory has not gained 
widespread support, perhaps because today’s CICs do not 
completely replace local public governments in the same way that 
a company town did in the time of Marsh.59 Both of these theories 
have generally been rejected by courts.60 Today, aside from Fair 
Housing Act prohibitions of sale transfer restrictions that are 
                                                          
56 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18 (1944); Midlake on Big Boulder 
Lake Condo. Ass’n v. Cappuccio, 673 A.2d 340 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) 
(holding that the owners “contractually agreed to abide by the provisions in the 
Declaration at the time of purchase, thereby relinquishing their freedom of 
speech concerns regarding placing signs on the property”); but see Goldberg 
v. 400 E. Ohio, Condo., 12 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1998).  
57 See Katherine Rosenberry, An Introduction to Constitutional Challenges 
to Covenant Enforcement, 1 J. COMM. ASS’N 23 (1998).  
58 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
59 HYATT, supra note 4, at 64–65; see also, e.g., Goldberg v. 400 E. 
Ohio Condo. Ass’n, 12 F. Supp. 2d 820 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“Demonstrating that 
condominiums do certain things that state governments also do doesn’t show 
that condominiums are acting as the state or in the state’s place.”). The 
holding in Marsh has been applied to cases having to do with public 
accommodation and access. Id.; see also Amalgamated Food Emp. Union, 
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), abrogated by 
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). For an interesting discussion 
regarding the extent to which CICs function as municipal governments with 
respect to non-members, see David J. Kennedy, Residential Associations as 
State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 
105 YALE L.J. 761(1995). 
60 HYATT, supra note 4, at 67. See, e.g., Pines of Boca Barwood Condo. 
Ass’n v. Cavouti, 605 So. 2d 984, 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); White 
Egret, 379 So.3d at 349. 
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based on a constitutionally protected classification (race, religion, 
etc.),61 and the odd outlier decision,62 the U.S. Constitution 
apparently does not provide any substantive oversight of common 
interest community covenants. 
A few courts have been willing to invalidate CIC governing 
acts on the basis of state constitutional violations.63 Cases where 
state constitutional guaranties have been applied to CIC 
governance mostly deal with freedom of speech and rights of 
access.64 But other constitutional challenges abound. For 
example, recent cases dealing with both state and federal 
constitutional claims have raised the issue of whether freedom of 
religion guaranties can prohibit CIC regulation of placement of a 
mezuzah on a doorframe65 or painting a kolam on a driveway.66 
                                                          
61 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19 (2012). The Act, as 
amended, prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of 
dwellings, and in other housing-related transactions, based on race, color, 
national origin, religion, sex, familial status (including children under the age 
of 18 living with parents or legal custodians, pregnant women, and people 
securing custody of children under the age of 18), and disability. Id. § 3604. 
62 For example, in Gerber v. Longboat Condominium, a veteran’s right to 
fly the American flag in violation of CIC covenants was upheld by the court 
striking down the covenant prohibition as a violation of the Constitution. 724 
F. Supp. 884 (M.D. Fla. 1989), aff’d in part on reh’g, Gerber g. Longboat 
Condominum, 757 F. Supp. 1339, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 1991). A different court 
criticized the Gerber decision as being based on emotion, not on law. Goldberg 
v. 400 East Ohio Condo., 12 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1998).  
63 E.g., Comm. For A Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ 
Ass’n, 929 A.2d 1060, 1072 (N.J. 2007) (explaining that New Jersey 
constitutional application does not necessarily require a public actor); see also 
HYATT, supra note 4, 67–73; Frank Askin, Free Speech, Private Space, and 
the Constitution, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 947, 960–61 (1998). 
64 E.g., Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found. of Laguna Hills, 
182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Guttenberg Taxpayers & 
Rentpayer’s Ass’n v. Galaxy Towers Condo. Ass’n, 688 A.2d 156, 158–59 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996); Midlake on Big Boulder Lake Condo. Ass’n 
v. Cappuccio, 673 A.2d 340 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). See also Pruneyard 
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 47447 U.S. 74 (1980) (explaining that a state’s 
constitution may protect individuals from private actors even when the U.S. 
Constitution would not). 
65 A mezuzah is a small container holding handwritten parchment with a 
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State action problems also plague state constitutional claims in the 
CIC context, and the law in this area is muddled and 
inconsistent.67 
Unless proven to be “arbitrary, against public policy or 
                                                          
scriptoral passage that is affixed to the entranceway to a home by devout Jews. 
The Seventh Circuit in Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009), 
held that a CIC rule prohibiting “objects of any sort” outside a resident’s door 
was neutral as to religion and therefore reasonable and enforceable. It is 
common for CICs to restrict changes to the exterior of homes without 
association permission. See Angela C. Carmella, Religion-Free Environments 
in Common Interest Communities, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 57, 68 (2010) (discussing 
“aesthetic controls on signs, symbols, decorations, statuary, or items of any 
kind”). 
66 A kolam is a Hindu religious symbol of welcome, typically made with 
colored rice flour. In 2008, a devout Hindu resident of a Virginia CIC painted 
a kolam on their driveway rather than using rice flour because of expected 
rain. The association fined the family $900 for failing to keep their driveway 
asphalt in its “original black state.” Annie Gowen, Driveway Painting Tests 
Religious Freedom, WASH. POST (Dec. 8 2008), http://articles. 
washingtonpost.com/2008-12-08/news/36795471_1_kolam-driveway-hindu.  
67 Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and 
Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303 (1998) [hereinafter Hyatt, 
Common Interest Communities] (explaining that the property application of 
constitutional principles to CIC governance is an unsettled area of the law). 
There are occasional cases that test the application of constitutional protections 
to CIC governance actions, and the most emotionally charged cases do much 
to muddy the jurisprudence in this area. An example is Gerber v. Longboat 
Condominium, in which a CIC denied a veteran’s right to fly an American 
flag. The court found that this act violated the owner’s constitutional rights. 
724 F. Supp. 884 (M.D. Fla. 1989), aff’d in part on reh’g, Gerber v. 
Longboat Condo., 757 F. Supp. 1339, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 1991). During the 
post-9/11 patriotic fervor, Congress felt compelled to pass a law guaranteeing 
the right of homeowners to fly Old Glory. The Freedom to Display the 
American Flag Act, codified at 4 U.S.C.A. § 5 (2012), prohibits a CIC from 
adopting or enforcing any policy that would unreasonably restrict or prevent a 
member of the association from displaying the flag of the United States. See 
Robin Miller, Annotation, Restrictive Covenants or Homeowners’ Association 
Regulations Restricting or Prohibiting Flags, Signage, or the Like on 
Homeowner’s Property as Restraint on Free Speech, 51 A.L.R. 6TH 533 
(2010) (cataloguing the various statutes that impact flag display and other “free 
speech” rights in CICs). 
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violat[ive of] some fundamental constitutional right of unit 
owners,” covenants contained in a CIC’s original declaration are 
presumptively valid.68 Public policy and constitutional constraints 
on the substance of CIC covenants are quite limited, and in the 
vast majority of cases, covenants are upheld. Courts and scholars 
reason that “[t]he initial members of a homeowners association, 
by their voluntary acts of joining, unanimously consent to the 
provisions in the association’s original governing documents.”69 
Covenant amendments or rules enacted by the board of directors, 
however, are subject to slightly more judicial oversight, although 
the proper standard of review for such association or board 
actions is subject to some debate.70 Some courts use the Business 
Judgment Rule, borrowed from corporate law,71 in order to assess 
the validity of CIC governing acts.72 Other courts claim that CIC 
amendments and rules must be “reasonable” in order to be 
valid.73 And some jurisdictions use both tests: the more 
permissive Business Judgment Rule when associations are 
performing “business responsibilities” and the slightly less 
deferential rule of reasonableness when associations are engaging 
in community “governance.”74 The problem with this approach is 
                                                          
68 Apple II Condo. Ass’n v. Worth Bank & Trust Co., 659 N.E.2d 93, 98 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1995); see also Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 
P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994); Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 
639–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).  
69 Ellickson, supra note 49, at 1526–27. 
70 HYATT, supra note 4, at 89–97.  
71 The Business Judgment Rule is not a standard of conduct but rather a 
standard of review. DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS, Ch. 2, § A2 (4th ed. 1993 & 
Supp. 1995); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 472 A.2d 802, 812 (Del. 1984) 
(explaining the application of the business judgment rule as procedural, rather 
than substantive, judicial oversight). 
72 See, e.g., Schwarzmann v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 
Bridgehaven, 655 P.2d 1177 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982). 
73 See, e.g., Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Ass’n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 
1223, 1234 (Cal. 2004); Noble v. Murphy, 612 N.E.2d 266, 270 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1993). 
74 HYATT, supra note 4, at 89. 
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that it is difficult to determine when an association is acting as a 
business and when it is acting as a government, since “there is no 
bright line between the two” roles.75 
The Business Judgment Rule is a deliberately deferential 
standard of review. Under this standard, “absent a showing of 
fraud, dishonesty, or incompetence, it is not the court’s job to 
second-guess the actions of directors.”76 According to the 
Business Judgment Rule, if a business decision is made in good 
faith based on an honestly held rational belief that the decision is 
in the best interest of the entity, courts will not critique the 
decision.77 When applying the rule of reason, on the other hand, 
courts purport to balance the benefit of a particular governing act 
against its cost. In reality, however, courts do not engage in any 
precise cost-benefit analysis, and simply consider generally 
whether the particular governing act pertains to “the health, 
happiness and peace of mind of the unit owners.”78 The burden is 
on a complaining homeowner to prove a lack of nexus, and that a 
CIC governing act is therefore unreasonable.79 
Many scholars and judges conclude that this hands-off 
approach is appropriate because of freedom of contract. These 
commentators opine that there should be no real substantive 
judicial oversight of CIC governing acts and provisions.80 The 
proper role for a court, under this formulation, is to ensure the 
good faith of the decision-makers and the integrity of the process. 
                                                          
75 Id. 
76 Schwarzmann, 655 P.2d at 1181.  
77 See Aronson v. Lewis, 472 A.2d 802, 812 (Del. 1984) (explaining the 
application of the business judgment rule as procedural, rather than 
substantive, judicial oversight); Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1045 
(Pa. 1997). 
78 E.g., Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181–
82; (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Preserve at Forrest Crossing Townhome Ass’n 
v. DeVaughn, No. M2011-02755-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 396000 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Jan. 30, 2013). See also infra notes 89–96 and accompanying text. 
79 HYATT, supra note 4, at 88–97. 
80 See e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 906, 920 (1988) [hereinafter Epstein, Covenants and 
Constitutions]. 
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Other scholars justify a more robust judicial review of  covenant 
amendments and rule-making, asserting that courts have the 
power to make a substantive inquiry as to whether an association 
is acting within its scope of authority and whether the action 
bears a rational relationship to legitimate purposes of the CIC.81 
In the corporate context, the Business Judgment Rule is 
justified based on judicial policy of leaving business decisions to 
the business experts. In the context of CIC governance, the 
decision-makers are volunteer laypeople, not corporate 
executives.82 Nevertheless, the several courts that have embraced 
the Business Judgment Rule standard to review CIC governance 
have failed to note this difference in context. For example, New 
York’s Superior Court, in Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. 
Apartment Corp., acknowledged that “[e]ven when the governing 
board acts within the scope of its authority, some check on its 
potential powers to regulate residents’ conduct, life-style and 
property rights is necessary,” but then it concluded that the 
Business Judgment Rule is the most appropriate standard of 
review to achieve that “check” on association power.83 According 
to the Levandusky court, adopting the Business Judgment Rule 
means that judges should not inquire into actions taken in good 
faith “in the lawful and legitimate furtherance of corporate 
purposes.”84 California agreed with New York’s Levandusky 
opinion and adopted the Business Judgment Rule approach to CIC 
governance in Lamden v. LaJolla Shores Clubdominium 
Homeowners Ass’n.85  Thus, in at least the two of the most 
populous states, CIC governance decisions are unconstrained by 
                                                          
81 HYATT, supra note 4, at 98; see also Joseph William Singer, The Rule 
of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1369, 1414 (2013). 
82 CICs are really not corporations in the traditional sense. For example, 
they are not staffed by professional corporate directors and there are no 
disinterested directors. HYATT, supra note 4, at 90. 
83 Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 554 N.Y.S.2d 807, 
811 (1990). 
84 Id. The court specifically rejected the reasonableness standard adopted 
by the appellate court. 
85 980 P.2d 940 (Cal. 1999) (finding that Business Judgment Rule applies 
regardless of corporate form for CIC association board actions). 
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any substantive judicial oversight. 
Other jurisdictions purport to apply the rule of reason in 
assessing the validity of CIC governance. The courts’ use of 
reasonable review theoretically includes an element of subjective 
review, but in practice, reasonableness review of CIC actions 
focuses almost exclusively on whether the association followed 
the enumerated procedures in amending the CC&Rs or passing 
community rules.86 Although most courts assert that only 
“reasonable” governing acts will be upheld, courts rarely explain 
what this standard means or engage in any methodical balancing 
of equities.87 In many cases, courts have essentially defined 
reasonable to include anything that could possibly promote 
community purposes, typically defined as preserving and 
improving property values and owner “lifestyle.”88 In circular 
logic, some courts give the board of the CIC association the 
discretion to determine which of its governing acts are 
“reasonable.”89 Meanwhile, other courts claim to require 
reasonableness but instead actually apply the Business Judgment 
Rule standard of review.90  
                                                          
86 See Hyatt, Common Interest Communities, supra note 67, at 354. 
87 Id. Robert C. Ellickson opined that “reasonableness” in CIC 
jurisprudence means different things to different courts. Ellickson opposed 
“reasonableness” review in the name of freedom of contract. He stated: 
“Reasonable,” the most ubiquitous legal adjective, is not 
self-defining. In reviewing an association’s legislative or 
administrative decisions, many judges have viewed the 
“reasonableness” standard as entitling them to undertake an 
independent cost-benefit analysis of the decision under 
review and to invalidate association decisions that are not 
cost-justified by general societal standards. This variant of 
reasonableness review ignores the contractarian 
underpinnings of the private association. 
Ellickson, supra note 49, at 1530. 
88 See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1290 
(Cal. 1994); Cohen v. Kite Hill Cmty. Ass’n, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1983); Laguna Royale Owners Ass’n v. Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
89 See Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). 
90 Papalexiou v. Tower West Condo, 401 A.2d 280, 284 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
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Considering the actual approach that most courts use in 
analyzing the validity of CIC amendments and rulemaking, the 
distinction between the various purported standards of review 
blurs. Although different jurisdictions purport to adopt distinct 
oversight standards, in effect, most courts approach this issue in 
essentially the same way: original covenants are presumptively 
valid, and covenant amendments and rules adopted in accordance 
with the procedures enumerated in the declaration are also valid 
unless they are arbitrary or promulgated in bad faith.91  In Lieber 
v. Point Loma Tennis Club, for example, the court held that a 
regulation is deemed “reasonable” if it is not arbitrary and there 
are valid reasons that an association might choose to enact the 
rule.92  This standard is not a cost-benefit balancing test, but 
rather mirrors oversight in administrative law, upholding rules 
duly enacted as long as they are not arbitrary and capricious.93  
Regardless of standard used, courts almost universally uphold and 
enforce CIC covenants and regulations. 
 
II. THE COVENANT—CONTRACT MISMATCH 
 
A. Adhesion and “Assent” 
 
If contracts are not voluntary, the liberty and efficiency 
justifications for their enforcement evaporate. In the context of 
standard form and adhesion contracting, the voluntariness 
associated with freedom of contract is diminished.94 Nevertheless, 
                                                          
Ch. Div. 1979). 
91 HYATT, supra note 4, at 56–57.   
92 Lieber v. Point Loma Tennis Club, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 788–89 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1995) (finding that if it is not arbitrary, meaning there are valid 
reasons that an association might choose a regulation, it is “reasonable”).  
93 See Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1975); Note, Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
647 (1981); see also HYATT, supra note 4, at 58. The lack of substantive 
review of CIC covenants has inspired calls for a return to a robust “touch and 
concern” test as a way of reigning in CICs. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 
31, at 293–94. 
94 In adhesion contracts, “[a]ctual assent is not just a fiction because of 
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contracting pursuant to a non-negotiable standard form, 
particularly in agreements between parties of disparate bargaining 
power, is an increasingly common facet of modern reality,95 and 
courts have uniformly upheld the enforceability of adhesion 
contracts absent some special circumstance.96 Nevertheless, it is 
important to recognize that contractual theory imperfectly fits 
with the reality of non-negotiable forms.97 Standard, boilerplate 
terms are rarely read or negotiated.98 The resulting contractual 
                                                          
voluntary choices by consumers; it is effectively impossible.” Alan M. White 
& Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
233, 242 (2002); see also Batya Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped 
the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 319, 332 (1999); Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law of 
Adhesion Contracts: A Judicial Response to the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 14 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1035 (2010).  
95 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600 (1991); Todd 
D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1174, 1225 (1983) [hereinafter Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion]; 
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631 (1943). Generally, courts find that a 
non-negotiable standard form contract “offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis” 
by a party with superior sophistication and bargaining power is an “adhesion 
contract.” David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and 
Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 432 (2009). 
96 Nw. Nat’l. Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990). 
Modern contractual theory is based on objective manifestation of assent rather 
than subjective “meeting of the minds.” An indication of assent such as 
clicking “I accept” to posted terms or by initialing a form contract is clearly 
sufficient for legally binding obligation. Russell A. Hakes, Focusing on the 
Realities of the Contracting Process—an Essential Step to Achieve Justice in 
Contract Enforcement, 12 DEL. L. REV. 95, 99–100 (2011).  
97 Several scholars have articulated the problematic disconnect between 
freedom of contract rhetoric and theory and the realities of the contracting 
process in the context of standard, non-negotiable forms. E.g., Hakes, supra 
note 96, at 96. 
98 One April Fools’ Day, British retailer GameStation added a clause to its 
posted terms and conditions providing that customers were selling their 
“immortal souls” to the retailer. Approximately 88% of the contracting 
customers did not opt out of this clause. 7,500 Online Shoppers Unknowingly 
Sold Their Souls, FOX NEWS (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/ 
2010/04/15/online-shoppers-unknowingly-sold-souls/. Scholarly consensus 
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substance therefore represents one party’s demands and the 
other’s acquiescence rather than jointly determined content. 
Although enforceable, the terms of such a contract do not 
necessarily reflect mutual intent.99 And when a contract’s terms 
are not actually elected by both parties, the contract does not 
necessarily promote efficient outcomes or create wealth.100 
                                                          
supports the conclusion that standard form contracts are rarely read. Margaret 
Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of 
Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1231–32 (2006); Todd D. Rakoff, The 
Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1235, 1237–38 (2006) 
[hereinafter Rakoff, Law and Sociology]; Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond 
Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing Assent” as the Basis for 
Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 469 (2008); Hakes, supra note 96, at 100. Recently, Judge Richard 
Posner publicly admitted that he never read the documents he signed at his 
mortgage loan closing. David Lat, Do Lawyers Actually Read Boilerplate 
Contracts?, ABOVE THE LAW (June 22, 2010, 2:42 PM) 
http://abovethelaw.com/2010/06/do-lawyers-actaully-read-boilerplate-
contracts-judge-richard-posner-doesnt-do-you/. 
99 This can result in standard contract language that works to the detriment 
of both parties, but somehow persists in light of adverse interpretation. See 
MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE 
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (2012); 
Andrea J. Boyack, Sovereign Debt and The Three and a Half Minute 
Transaction: What Sticky Boilerplate Reveals About Contract Law and 
Practice, 35 WHITTIER L. REV. 1 (2013). 
100 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3, 9, 48–49 
(8th ed. 2010) (explaining that rational self-interest and voluntary contracting 
is why transactions are efficient); Howard C. Ellis, Employment-at-Will and 
Contract Principles: The Paradigm of Pennsylvania, 96 DICK. L. REV. 595, 
596–97 (1992) (explaining that voluntary contracting promotes efficiency). 
Economic theory posits that optimal efficiency results when individuals may 
contract freely, and judicial protection of the future expectations created by 
contracts increases societal wealth. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT 
LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE STUDY 10, 22–23 (1965). 
Wealth maximization through contract enforcement is a foundational concept 
in the law. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 157 
(2000) (“Law is the instrument that fixes and realizes capital.”); Morris R. 
Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 562–63 (1933) (“[A] 
regime in which contracts are freely made and generally enforced gives greater 
scope to individual initiative and thus promotes the greatest wealth of a 
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Adhesion contracts are enforceable, but legal theory has 
evolved to take into account the lack of voluntariness and content 
input inherent in adhesion contexts through modern doctrines 
such as unconscionability101 and distinct approaches to 
interpretation for adhesion contracts.102 Courts recognize that 
traditional deference to contractual terms may be inappropriate 
for contracts of adhesion, and they therefore sometimes monitor 
the substantive fairness of a contract in an adhesion contract 
context.103 This paternalistic approach diverges markedly from 
traditional hands-off contract enforcement and has led some 
observers to opine that contract law is now evolving along two 
                                                          
nation.”). Economic theory asserts that unfairness and social inefficiencies in 
form contracts will be winnowed out through market competition, but this 
theory incorrectly assumes unbounded rationality of the consumer. The 
realities of adhesion contracting processes and consumer rationality undercut 
this theory and permit inefficient and socially unjustified terms to persist even 
in a free market. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form 
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003). 
101 See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (“Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include 
an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with 
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”). 
102 When a written contract has been drafted solely by one party, courts 
invoke the doctrine of contra proferentum (“against the offeror”) that “requires 
that ambiguity in non-negotiated or adhesion contracts to be construed against 
the profferer.” Karnette v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 444 F. Supp. 2d 
640, 647 (E.D. Va. 2006). In the context of adhesion contracts, courts 
sometimes construe a contract “to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the 
average member of the public who accepts it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 237 cmt. E (1981); see also C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied 
Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 172 (Iowa 1975). 
103 See Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC, 975 A.2d 494, 502 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009), aff’d, 1 A.3d 678 (N.J. 2010) (explaining that in 
adhesion contracts, a court should consider the “substantive contents of the 
agreement” as well as the process that led to its execution); C & J Fertilizer, 
227 N.W.2d at 174–75 (explaining that the court is responsible for exercising 
oversight with respect to the fairness and content of terms in a contract of 
adhesion). Professor Rakoff advocates that adhesion contracts be considered 
presumptively unenforceable. See Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 
95, at 1176. 
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tracks: a traditional assessment of process-based oversight for 
agreements between equally situated parties and a protective, 
regulatory approach with respect to “unsophisticated parties” in 
contracts of adhesion.104  
Contract theorists justify the enforceability of contracts of 
adhesion with reference to market forces that will act to monitor 
and constrain the content of such contracts.105 But market checks 
only work when the market provides choices. It is increasingly 
true that in many areas of the country, most home purchase 
options are in CICs.106 Shopping around among various CICs 
                                                          
104 Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New 
Formalism, 75 MO. L. REV. 493 (2010); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, 
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 545 
(2003); see also L & L Wings, Inc. v. Marco-Destin, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 
359 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that party sophistication and bargaining power 
should be a factor to consider in determining whether a liquidated damages 
provision is enforceable). This latter approach has more in common with the 
European policy of prospectively approving the substance of form contracts 
prior to enforcement. See LEONE NIGLIA, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CONTRACT IN EUROPE (2003) (explaining how contract law in Europe has 
evolved to deal with standard form contracts). 
105 See James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory 
Servitudes: Toward Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and 
Personal Identity, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1, 29–32 (1989) (explaining the theory 
that “marginal consumers” will operate as market checks on overreaching by 
drafters of non-negotiable forms). 
106 Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50, at 1113–14; Steven Siegel, The 
Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition of 
Constitutional Rights in Private Residential Communities Fifty Years After 
Marsh v. Alabama, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 461, 469 (1998) [hereinafter 
Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government]; see also ROBERT JAY 
DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS 
IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 38 (1992) (“Although [CICs] do provide more 
consumer options in the abstract, in many areas of the country [association-
related housing] now dominate[s] the local housing market and [is] 
increasingly offering fairly uniform levels and types of services.”); JOEL 
GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER 189 (1991) (“If you want 
a new home, it is increasingly difficult to get one that doesn’t come with a 
homeowners’ association.”); Boyack, Community Collateral Damage, supra 
note 2, at 59 (“The states with recent growth booms . . . have the highest 
percentage of citizens residing in privately governed CICs.”). 
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offers no real choice either: most CIC declarations are virtually 
identical.107 In this context, market forces cannot justify the 
content of a contract of adhesion. 
CIC declarations clearly fit the definition of an adhesion 
contract.108 Terms of a declaration are completely non-negotiable; 
in fact, prior to contracting they are prescribed and recorded in 
the land records.109 In addition, because one form binds multiple 
parties, no party has the ability to diverge from the recorded 
provisions. It is a perfect example of “take-it-or-leave-it” 
contracting.  
Furthermore, CIC covenants are bundled with a real estate 
purchase. If a would-be buyer does not agree to the terms, she 
must relinquish the right to buy that property.  Since each parcel 
of real property is presumed unique in our legal system,110 a 
buyer who forgoes a particular purchase has no true substitute. 
Homebuyers consider numerous factors in choosing which parcel 
                                                          
107 See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50, at 1113–14 (“There exists no 
meaningful consumer choice amongst CIC organizational structures. In 
general, developer-imposed CIC templates are remarkably uniform.”). Even if 
buyers could shop around based on the particular provisions of a given CIC 
regime, this would be unlikely. Buyers often do not see the CIC declaration 
and associated documents until at or close to closing, and at closing, disclosure 
requirements mandate that a tremendous amount of paperwork is given to 
buyers. The sheer volume provided minimizes the likelihood that the buyer 
will review or understand the disclosures. Note, Judicial Review of 
Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 647, 650 (1981). 
108 C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 174–
75 (Iowa 1975). Professor Rakoff has enumerated seven criteria that indicate a 
contract of adhesion: standard form drafted by one party who engages in 
repeated transactions of the sort presented as non-negotiable to the adhering 
party who enters into relatively few transactions of the sort, signed by the 
adhering party, and principally obligates the adhering party to pay money. 
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 95, at 1177.  
109 See Winokur, supra note 105, at 33 (concluding that such “built-in, 
substantive limitations on modification of uniform servitude forms present 
obstacles to market discipline by marginal consumers”). 
110 See Shelton v. Keller, 748 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988); 
Real Estate Analytics, LLC v. Vallas, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 835, 836 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2008).  
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of real property to buy, including school districts, lot size and 
configuration, tax assessment and appraisal, quality of 
construction, and even such things as the smell of the home and 
the orientation and exposure to natural light.111 The content of 
CIC covenants and rules is likely not even a factor considered 
prior to purchase or, if considered, is a fairly unimportant detail 
in the home purchase calculus. 
UCIOA and statutes in virtually every state mandate that a 
seller of real property disclose the details of a private governance 
regime prior to or at the closing of a real estate purchase.112  
However the delivery of pages upon pages of legalese at or 
shortly before closing may do little to actually inform a buyer.113 
                                                          
111 The Department of Housing and Urban Development has even 
promulgated a homebuyer checklist to help purchasers track important aspects 
of properties they may buy. While extensive, the checklist does not explicitly 
discuss the scope or content of CIC governing provisions, although it does 
bring up “pet restrictions” as a line item for consideration. Aside from pet 
restrictions, however, the only reference to neighborhood covenants is a line 
item as to whether they are “good, average or poor” (whatever that means). 
For more information on the HUD homebuyer checklist and related 
documents, see Buying a Home, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/buying_a_home (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2014).  
112 E.g., UCIOA, supra note 22, § 4; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-35.7-
102 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.401 (West 2013); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 508D-3.5 (West 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47E-4 (West 2013).  
113 The quantity of disclosures made in connection with a real estate 
purchase diminishes the ability of the disclosures to truly inform. See, e.g., 
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Comment, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 
(1986) (finding that “consumers who are faced with the dense text of form 
contracts characteristically respond by refusing to read”). Timing of disclosure 
in real estate conveyancing—in particular, disclosures made after a buyer has 
made an offer on a home—diminishes disclosure effectiveness as well. 
Stephanie Stern, Temporal Dynamics of Disclosure: The Example of 
Residential Real Estate Conveyancing, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 57. Recent studies 
of home mortgagors found that these buyers misapprehend or fail to read even 
the most basic parts of mortgage loan disclosure forms. Debra Pogrund Stark, 
et al., Ineffective in Any Form: How Confirmation Bias and Distractions 
Undermine Improved Home-Loan Disclosures, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 377, 
379 (2013) (explaining that studies of consumers show that they have 
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Typically, homebuyers are not represented by counsel in home 
purchase negotiations,114 and legal counsel conducting real estate 
closings do not generally undertake to review and advise the 
buyer with respect to CIC obligations.115 Under these 
circumstances, it is highly unlikely that a buyer reads or 
understands CC&Rs prior to closing.  
Finally, assent to the CIC terms does not even require a 
specific manifestation of acceptance thereof; rather, a party is 
deemed to have agreed simply by buying the land. Although this 
is true for any servitude, it is not the general rule for contract 
law, where a voluntary act manifesting intent to be bound is 
prerequisite to obligation.116 This simple fact further divorces true 
assent from legal obligation in the context of CIC covenants. 
 
B. Servitude Damages and Duration 
 
In the name of liberty and market freedom, our legal system 
generally eschews perpetual obligation and permits individuals to 
elect to walk away from their commitments (after payment of 
                                                          
“miss[ed] the critical information that disclosure forms were designed to 
communicate”). 
114 Most homeowners do not employ counsel to represent them in the 
conveyancing transaction. Debra Pogrund Stark et. al., Dysfunctional 
Contracts and the Laws and Practices That Enable Them: An Empirical 
Analysis, 46 IND. L. REV. 797, 801 (2013). Nor do buyers typically even have 
a realtor representing their interests because the agent working with a buyer is 
legally a seller’s sub-agent. The agent that works with the buyer is, in fact, 
often a seller’s subagent. Ann Morales Olazabal, Redefining Realtor 
Relationships and Responsibilities: The Failure of State Regulatory Responses, 
40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 65, 66 (2003). 
115 Lawyers who conduct residential real estate closings typically prepare 
the deed and coordinate with the title company and mortgage lender, if 
applicable, with respect to recordation. Such counsel facilitates the closing, but 
does not actually advise the buyer or assist buyer in reviewing disclosure 
documents. Gary D. Beelen, Odds Are, It’s Not “Your” Closing Attorney, 21 
DREW ECKL & FARNHAM, LLP J., no. 126, 2009, at 1, 1–5, available at 
http://www.deflaw.com/articles/odds-are-its-not-your-closing-attorney. 
116 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 (1981). 
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appropriate damages), and obtain a “clean slate.”117 The law 
reasonably protects a contracting party’s future autonomy from 
inescapable restraint by allowing exit via breach and 
reimbursement of the non-breaching party’s expectation interest 
in nearly all cases.118 Although breach typically provides an exit 
from perpetual contract obligation, when contracts take on an in 
rem character, attaching to real property as servitudes, that exit 
closes. Servitudes are generally enforced through “property” 
rules,119 meaning that the default remedy is specific 
performance.120 When an obligation is specifically enforceable, a 
                                                          
117 See NATHALIE MARTIN & OCEAN TAMA, BANKRUPTCY LAW: WHAT 
MATTERS AND WHY 24–25 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining that “a fresh start is 
deeply embedded in the American dream.”). For example, Bankruptcy law 
offers an exit from perpetual debt. Id.; see also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 
U.S. 234 (1934). There are a few exceptions to perpetual debt obligation. See 
generally Kurtis K. Wiard, Comment, Brunner’s Folly: The Road to 
Discharging Student Loans Is Paved with Unfounded Optimism, 52 
WASHBURN L.J. 357 (2013) (explaining bankruptcy courts’ varied applications 
of “undue hardship” in the student loan context). Employment law preserves 
exit from perpetual commitments of labor. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981) (“A promise to render personal service will not 
be specifically enforced.”). Several states have passed statutes prohibiting 
specific performance of a personal service contract. See, e.g., MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 27-1-412. And family law freely permits divorce. Peter Nash Swisher, 
Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269, 271 (1997) 
(discussing the “no-fault divorce revolution” of the past half-century). 
118 See POSNER, supra note 100, at 149–51; Oliver Wendell Holmes, The 
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). Specific performance is 
only available when an award of damages would not be adequate and various 
equitable requirements are met. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §16.1–.6 (4th ed. 1998). See also Ben Depoorter & 
Stephan Tontrup, How Law Frames Moral Intuitions: The Expressive Effect of 
Specific Performance, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 673, 717 (2012). 
119 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 
(1972). For a thorough discussion of how remedies in the case of CIC 
covenant violations unjustifiably diverge from contract damages, see Amos B. 
Elberg, Note, Remedies for Common Interest Development Rule Violations, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1958 (2001). 
120 Winokur, supra note 105, at 37 (“[T]he general availability of specific 
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party cannot opt out of the continuing affirmative requirement to 
comply. 
Servitudes depart from contract law in another key aspect that 
impacts individual liberty—their potentially infinite duration. A 
servitude obligation—unlike a contract—presumptively exists in 
perpetuity, binding against current and future owners of the land, 
and cannot be terminated through breach.121 For servitudes, 
contracting decisions today limit not only the contracting parties’ 
own future freedom but also the freedom of future generations of 
property owners.122 Problems of dead-hand control are thus 
endemic to covenants that run with the land.123 Under the 
common law, however, courts are generally empowered to strike 
down covenants that unduly restrain alienation on the basis of 
public policy.124 First-generation CICs created before widespread 
                                                          
performance as a remedial alternative to damages precludes an owner’s 
unilateral election to breach the servitude and pay damages.”). Issuing a 
mandatory injunction is the typical way that restrictive covenants are enforced. 
See, e.g., Depeyster v. Town of Santa Claus, 729 N.E.2d 183, 190 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2000); Metzner v. Wojdyla, 886 P.2d 154 (Wash. 1994). Servitude law 
draws a distinction between specifically enforceable equitable servitudes and 
real covenants that are enforceable through a grant of money damage, but this 
is a distinction without a difference. A given covenant-based servitude can be 
the subject of an action either in equity or in law at a plaintiff’s election, and it 
is easier to prove equitable grounds for recovery. See Runyon v. Paley, 416 
S.E.2d 177, 182–83 (N.C. 1992); JAMES L. WINOKUR ET AL., PROPERTY AND 
LAWYERING 642–43 (2002); Alfred L. Brophy, Contemplating When Equitable 
Servitudes Run with the Land, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691, 698 (2002). 
121 See Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson, 906 P.2d 1314, 
1320 (Cal. 1995); Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 
1283 (Cal. 1994); Thodos v. Shirk, 79 N.W.2d 733, 739 (Iowa 1956); Arnold 
v. Chandler, 428 A.2d 1235, 1237 (N.H. 1981).  
122 CIC covenants can be modified through supermajority vote of 
community members, but it is both cumbersome and practically difficult to 
amend CIC declarations. 
123 See HERBERT T. TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, 2 TIFFANY REAL PROP. § 
392 (3d ed. 2013); see also Earle v. Int’l Paper Co., 429 So. 2d 989, 995 
(Ala. 1983). The (in)famous Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to 
servitudes. See, e.g., Laguna Royale Owners Ass’n v. Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 
136, 144. (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
124 See, e.g., City of Oceanside v. McKenna, 265 Cal. Rptr. 275, 279 
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common interest ownership statutes were enacted in the 1970s 
and 1980s were cognizant of the common law’s hostility toward 
perpetual restrictions on land and contained expiration dates.125 
Today, statutes in every state explicitly or implicitly authorize 
CIC ownership structures, and courts routinely uphold CIC 
covenants even without effective temporal limits.126 Because CIC 
covenants have a virtually unlimited duration, their impact and 
effect is more expansive than contract law. Without durational 
restraints, substantive limitations are more justifiable. A CIC 
covenant that has an expansive or troubling scope—one that ties 
up land alienability or impacts personal freedoms, for example—
will not eventually just disappear. If courts lack the tools to 
constrain the subject matter of covenants, it may be impossible to 
nullify the legal impact of such covenants, even if the covenant 
eventually contradicts the values of society as a whole or the 
impacted neighborhood in general. 
Servitudes come in several flavors and have different, and 
evolving, legal formation requirements. Modernly, servitudes are 
                                                          
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (balancing the purposes of a restriction against the level 
of restrictiveness to determine validity); Cast v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce 
Trust & Savs. Ass’n of Lincoln, 183 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Neb. 1971) (finding 
restrictions on alienation in a fee simple estate “void and against public 
policy”); Mountain Springs Ass’n v. Wilson, 196 A.2d 270, 276 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1963) (invalidating an unreasonable restraint on alienation); 
Eagle Enter, Inc. v. Gross, 39 N.Y.2d 505, 508 (1976) (refusing to enforce an 
affirmative covenant as an unreasonable restraint on alienation); Gregory v. 
State Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation & Hosps., 495 A.2d 997, 1000, 
1002 (R.I. 1985) (reinterpreting a covenant to promote free alienability). In 
addition, most states have statutes granting judiciaries the power to invalidate 
restraints on alienation. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 711. (West 2012). 
125 See Welshire, Inc. v. Harbison, 91 A.2d 404 (Del. Ch. 1952) (30 
years); Van Sant v. Rose, 103 N.E. 194 (Ill. 1913) (43 years); Easton v. 
Careybrook Co., 123 A.2d 342 (Md.  Ct. App. 1956) (8-year initial term, then 
continued until modification by vote of majority of owners).  
126 Typically, CIC restrictions provide for automatic renewal after a given 
initial term. Under the law of Louisiana, however, restrictions imposing 
affirmative obligations cannot exist in perpetuity. Diefenthal v. Longue Vue 
Found., 865 So. 2d 863, 882 (La. Ct. App. 2004), writ denied, 869 So. 2d 
883 (La.). 
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generally grouped into easements and covenants.127 The variant 
closest to a conveyance is the easement—a right to make 
beneficial use of another’s land.128 Covenants running with the 
land, on the other hand, are closer in form and substance to 
contracts among neighbors, although of unlimited duration and 
specifically enforceable.129 Drawing the line between contracts 
that bind only the parties thereto and covenants that run with the 
land, thus binding on future owners is maddeningly difficult.130 
The law of servitude formation has been progressing from a more 
formalistic approach that demanded strict adherence to formal 
requirements of privity and property relevance (the so-called 
“touch and concern” requirement) toward a more liberalized 
approach such as that advocated by the Restatement (Third) of 
Property.131 Under the Third Restatement’s approach, anything 
that a valid contract can achieve can now be achieved in 
perpetuity by a covenant. This approach offers nothing to 
constrain the content of covenants aside from public policy limits 
that apply to contracts generally. Once, the touch and concern 
rule for valid formation of real covenants operated to limit the 
                                                          
127  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.3 (2000) no longer 
uses the terms “real covenant” and “equitable servitude” to distinguish 
between types of covenants. Instead, the Restatement calls both covenants 
created in writing and enforceable at law and a servitude implied in equity 
“covenants.”  
128 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2 (2000) defines 
“easement” as a “nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession 
of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized 
by the easement.” A “profit” is closely related to an easement, except that it 
additionally gives the beneficiary the right to extract something from the 
burdened land. Id.  
129 The current Restatement of Property departs from the use of the terms 
“real covenant” and “equitable servitude,” to refer to contracts that run with 
the land and therefore take on the character of property. Id. § 1.4. 
130 E.g., Barton v. Fred Netterville Lumber Co., 317 F. Supp. 2d 700, 
704 (S.D. Miss. 2004); Raintree Corp. v. Rowe, 248 S.E.2d 904, 907 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1978).  
131 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 2.1, 3.1, & 3.7 
(2000). See also supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text. 
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scope of perpetually restraining covenants,132 but as this 
requirement has been watered down and in some cases (per the 
new Restatement’s approach) eliminated, little substantive control 
remains with respect to what types of obligations real covenants 
can impose.133 Some courts purport to limit covenant enforcement 
to obligations that are “reasonable,”134 but many courts only 
apply reasonableness restraint to CIC covenant amendments, not 
the original covenants. Furthermore, the test for reasonableness is 
not rigorously nor consistently applied.135 
Servitude restrictions on land use preserve the status quo. 
Although this may be the very goal sought by the authors of the 
servitude, perpetual real property stasis imposes future 
opportunity costs. Servitude rigidity is potentially problematic for 
all easements and covenants, but most recent scholarly debate on 
the costs of rigidity has focused on the context of conservation 
servitudes.136 Conservation servitudes restrain use of land 
                                                          
132 Scholars who argue that covenants should be completely analogized to 
contracts have been the most vocal critics of the touch and concern test in the 
context of common interest communities. E.g., Epstein, Covenants and 
Constitution, supra note 80. 
133 Without substantive limits on the scope of CIC covenants, 
neighborhood private laws can “dictate basic aspects of a resident’s mode of 
living within the privacy of his or her own unit.” Armand Arabian, Condos, 
Cats, and CC&Rs: Invasion of the Castle Common, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1995). 
134 E.g., White Egret Condo., Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 351 (Fla. 
1979) (pre-FHA amendment case upholding age restrictions on condominium 
occupancy as “reasonable”); Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 
P.2d 1275, 1283 (Cal. 1994) (“[O]ur Legislature has made common interest 
development use restrictions contained in a project’s recorded declaration 
‘enforceable . . . unless unreasonable.’” (emphasis in original) (citation 
omitted)). 
135 See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. 
136 For a definition and overview of conservation easements, see Michael 
R. Eitel, Comment, Wyoming’s Trepidation Toward Conservation Easement 
Legislation: A Look at Two Issues Troubling the Wyoming State Legislature, 
4 WYO. L. REV. 57, 59 (2004). Conservation servitudes “present a difficult 
choice among conflicting social values. Although authorization of private 
conservation servitudes in gross reinforces freedom of contract, promotes the 
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indefinitely and are deliberately difficult to terminate.137 Placing 
perpetual burdens on land ignores the possibility of unexpected 
changes in land use needs.138 Even though today’s perfect 
candidate for conservation may be better allocated in the future to 
development, legally un-burdening land from servitude restraints 
                                                          
benefits of private initiative, and assists conservation of the natural 
environment, other important social policies suffer.” Korngold, Privately Held 
Conservation Servitudes, supra note 27, at 435. The term “conservation 
easements” is a misnomer because such servitudes are not non-possessory use 
rights of a non-owner but instead are restrictions on an owner’s ability to use 
her own land. Id. at 436–37. There are some key differences between CIC 
restraints on transfer and conservation servitudes, most importantly that the 
former involves a restriction on alienation and the latter only restrains use. 
137 Id. at 439–43. Indeed, the whole point of conservation easements is to 
render future land development impossible. Id. at 479, 453–54; see also Julia 
D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 
88 VA. L. REV. 739, 767 (2002) (“[C]onservation servitudes can achieve their 
goals if and only if the future options of owners of burdened land are 
constrained.”). 
138 Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 27, at 
479. Some scholars have advocated a periodic review by courts to determine 
whether the easement merits continued validity or should be stricken as a 
matter of fairness or efficiency. Gerald Korngold, Resolving the 
Intergenerational Conflicts of Real Property Law: Preserving Free Markets 
and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1525 
(2007) [hereinafter Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts]; 
Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation 
Easements: Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public Use 
Land Process, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1039 [hereinafter Korngold, Solving the 
Contentious Issues]. Another approach would be to make the beneficiaries of 
such easements public entities, constrained by the democratic process. See 
Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 27. Other 
scholars contend that the perpetual validity of conservation servitudes must be 
vigorously upheld. See Jessica E. Jay, When Perpetual Is Not Forever: The 
Challenge of Changing Conditions, Amendment, and Termination of Perpetual 
Conservation Easements, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012); Nancy A. 
McLaughlin & Mark Benjamin Machlis, Protecting the Public Interest and 
Investment in Conservation: A Response to Professor Korngold’s Critique of 
Conservation Easements, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1561; Nancy A. McLaughlin & 
W. William Weeks, In Defense of Conservation Easements, 9 WYO. L. REV. 1 
(2009). 
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may be impracticable.139 Future generations will bear the costs of 
today’s land restraints.140 These same worries regarding unlimited 
duration and specific enforceability that have engendered much 
debate in the context of conservation easements also apply to 
community CC&Rs. Such covenants impose a particular vision of 
community use and behavior that is resistant to change and 
difficult to avoid.  
 
C. Covenant Predictability and Community Exit 
 
Although any type of perpetual covenant may become onerous 
and undesirable over time, the content of community CC&Rs are 
less rigid than conservation servitudes and other types of 
easements and covenants. Unlike traditional servitudes, CIC 
covenants can be amended by community vote.141 This flexibility 
mitigates some of the concerns otherwise posed by the unlimited 
duration of CIC servitudes. The ability to amend covenants is 
also a great advantage to the CIC structure compared with earlier 
neighborhood deed restriction schemes that provided no method 
for modification or termination of servitude restraints. But the 
                                                          
139 See Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 27; 
Mahoney, supra note 137, at 769; see also Federico Cheever, Public Good and 
Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and Conservation Easements: A 
Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077, 1098 
(1996). 
140 Several scholars have focused on the issue of perpetual validity of 
conservation servitudes and have pointed out that the status quo may not give 
adequate weight to the costs of alienation restraints. E.g., Cheever, supra note 
139; Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 27; 
Mahoney, supra note 137; Jessica Owley, Changing Property in a Changing 
World: A Call for the End of Perpetual Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 121, 144 (2011). 
141 CIC declarations can be amended by prescribed procedures, typically 
by supermajority vote of the owners. UCIOA provides that the declaration may 
be amended with a 67% affirmative vote unless the declaration specifies a 
different percentage or certain occupancy rules are impacted (threshold in that 
case is 80%). UCIOA, supra note 22, § 2-117. In addition to amending 
covenants, association boards enact (and change) implementing rules and 
regulations from time to time as they see fit.  
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benefit of flexibility is achieved at the cost of predictability. 
Because CC&R establish a dynamic association government, 
CICs are more adaptable than regimes that are controlled solely 
by the rigid provisions of a recorded document, but the changing 
nature of obligation in the case of CICs renders the obligation 
itself more difficult to justify on contractual reliance grounds.142 
Thus, there are two opposite problems potentially posed by the 
possibility of changing CIC governing provisions. First, changes 
may be too difficult to achieve and may not in fact be 
forthcoming even when changing circumstances so warrant. 
Second, rule changes may be inspired by the whims of vocal 
neighborhood minorities and not actually reflect changing 
circumstances or new community values. If changes are non-
unanimous (as is almost universally the case), then it is more 
difficult to justify the application of such changes to dissenting 
homeowners based on their supposed assent. Furthermore, 
unforeseen changes to community covenants may frustrate the 
reasonable expectations and desires of dissenting owners who 
bought into a community that was governed by a different set of 
substantive rules.  
Theoretically, a community’s ability to amend covenant 
restrictions should provide a means to update neighborhood 
governance to reflect new cultural preferences and technological 
changes impacting property use. In reality, covenants are difficult 
to amend.143 Whether a given community is able to mobilize 
sufficient votes for a given amendment turns on the idiosyncratic 
concerns of owners and the level of popular participation in the 
community.144 When restrictions in recorded declarations are 
                                                          
142 See Brower, supra note 20, at 242 (noting that CIC enforcement is 
justified based on the unanimous assent of its members to covenant terms and 
explaining that later amendments “pose special problems”).  
143 Amendments to CC&Rs are difficult to achieve in reality because of 
the generally low level of community engagement and participation coupled 
with the high levels of required assent. See generally Sterk, supra note 10. 
144 STEPHEN E. BARTON & CAROL J. SILVERMAN, COMMON INTEREST 
HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS MANAGEMENT STUDY (Cal. Dep’t Real Estate 
ed., 1987) (showing low levels of participation in community governance and 
concluding that many communities are not governed according to majority 
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difficult to modify, outdated laws will govern behavior and land 
use in the community. For example, many CC&Rs drafted in the 
1970s and 1980s prohibit “satellite dishes,” based on the concern 
over blocked views and the unsightly nature of enormous satellite 
dishes such as those used at the time.145  Today’s satellite dishes 
are tiny and unobtrusive, yet covenants banning “satellite dishes” 
remain legally binding until they are removed by a 
supermajority.146 Other covenant restrictions that commonly 
persist, despite being criticized as obsolete, include prohibitions 
on trucks and laundry lines. Such blanket prohibitions seem 
unwarranted based on the modern trends of, respectively, driving 
a small pick-up truck as a passenger vehicle147 and air-drying of 
clothes in an effort to be more eco-friendly.148 It would appear, 
                                                          
desires but rather the idiosyncratic concerns of a vocal minority). 
145 See River Oaks Place Council of Co-Owners v. Daly, 172 S.W.3d 
314, 325 (Tex. App. 2005) (an association may ban satellite dishes 
notwithstanding FCC regulations).  
146 Id. But see Portola Hills Cmty. Ass’n v. James, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 
583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (striking down a restriction on satellite dishes as 
unreasonably obsolete), disapproved of by Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village 
Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1290 (Cal. 1994) (reasonableness should be 
determined facially, not as applied to a particular circumstance).  
147 In Bernardo Villas Mgmt. Corp. v. Black, a California court 
invalidated a restriction on trucks as unreasonable “as applied to clean, 
noncommercial pickup truck used by owners solely for personal 
transportation.” 235 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987), disapproved of by 
Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1290 (reasonableness should be determined facially, not 
as applied to a particular circumstance). 
148 “Virtually all” CICs ban outdoor clotheslines. Laura Thomas Gebert, 
Comment, A Survey of Selected Government-Sponsored Energy Plans and 
Recommendations for Florida’s Future Energy Policy, 8 BARRY L. REV. 149, 
166 (2007). A typical covenant provides that “[n]o laundry or other clothes 
may be hung or displayed outside any Unit.” Mazdabrook Commons 
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, No. DC-011532-08, 2010 WL 3517030, at *12 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 1, 2010), aff’d, 46 A.3d 507 (N.J. 2012). 
Florida and Utah now have statutes protecting the “right to dry,” but statutory 
fixes are recent and exist in a minority of states. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
163.04(1)–(2) (West 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-610 (West 2006). See 
also Dusty Horwitt, The Right to Dry Laundry on the Line, LEGAL AFF., 
Jan./Feb. 2004, at 10, 11 (“In California, about seven million people can’t 
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however, that changing community opinions and mores is easier 
than changing community covenants. 
Spotty public participation in community governance, hold-
outs, and idiosyncratic vocal minorities make the flexibility of the 
CIC governance model haphazard. This unpredictable flexibility 
means that rules may change in unexpected ways. An association 
may enact a completely new restriction, never anticipated by 
members when they purchased property in the community.149 For 
example, in a 1978 California case, a mother and her two 
children were forced out of their home when their association 
passed a covenant amendment prohibiting occupancy by anyone 
under 18.150 More recently, a smoker who purchased a 
                                                          
hang their clothes in public because of the policies of about 40,000 community 
associations.”). For a general discussion of ways that CIC covenants inhibit 
green living practices, see Mark A. Pike, Note, Green Building Red-Lighted 
by Homeowners’ Associations, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
923, 932–35 (2009). 
149 There is a thread of case law that attempts to distinguish between 
changes to CIC covenant terms and the addition of new terms, with courts 
holding that amendment provisions in an original declaration authorize changes 
but not additions. E.g., Lakeland Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Larson, 459 N.E.2d 
1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Boyles v. Hausmann, 517 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Neb. 
1994). The reasoning in these cases has been criticized as logically flawed. See 
Evergreen Highlands Ass’n v. West, 73 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2003). For example, 
changing a provision explicitly permitting leasing to explicitly prohibit leasing 
would be permitted under the reasoning of Boyles, but adopting a leasing 
prohibition would not be permitted if the original declaration was silent as to 
an owner’s ability to lease. More recent cases have implicitly overruled or 
simply ignored these holdings. See, e.g., Apple II, Condo. Ass’n v. Worth 
Bank & Trust Co., 659 N.E.2d 93 (holding that addition of leasing limitation 
was valid without even acknowledging the conflict with the Lakeland 
precedent). 
150 Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condo. Ass’n, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695, 700 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1978). Age-based restrictions were not prohibited by statute in 1978, 
but a later amendment of the Fair Housing Act created a statutory basis for 
striking down such restrictions. See  Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
3601–19 (2012). The Act, as amended, prohibits discrimination in the sale, 
rental, and financing of dwellings, and in other housing-related transactions, 
based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex, familial status (including 
children under the age of 18 living with parents or legal custodians, pregnant 
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condominium unit in Colorado likewise did not anticipate that his 
association would later amend the declaration to prohibit smoking 
in any part of the building, including inside his home.151  
By purchasing property in a CIC, an owner is deemed to have 
agreed to be bound not just to the terms of the recorded 
declaration but also to any changes that a sufficient percentage of 
her neighbors may later enact.152 In many cases, the standard for 
judicial review of declaration amendments is a variant of the 
Business Judgment Rule—changes to owner obligations are 
deemed valid as long as the association acted in good faith and 
followed procedures enumerated in the governing documents.153 
                                                          
women, and people securing custody of children under the age of 18), and 
disability. Id. § 3604. 
151 After the judge’s ruling, the homeowner complained to the press that, 
“I can’t relax and have a cigarette in my own home.” Ann Schrader, Couple’s 
Smoking at Home Snuffed, DENVER POST (Nov. 16, 2006), 
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_4667551; see also David B. Ezra, “Get 
Your Ashes Out of My Living Room!”: Controlling Tobacco Smoke in Multi-
Unit Residential Housing, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 135, 139 (2001) (exploring the 
legal aspects of prohibiting smoking inside condominium units); Staci Semrad, 
A New Arena in the Fight Over Smoking: The Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 
2007, at A18 (detailing efforts within condominiums across the country to ban 
smoking inside units).  
152 While oversight of amendments is minor, judicial review of restrictions 
contained in the original declaration is often even more cursory. See Noble v. 
Murphy, 612 N.E.2d 266, 270 (Mass. Ct. App. 1993); Brower, supra note 20, 
at 242. A complaining owner must prove that an amendment is “unreasonable” 
or it will be specifically enforceable. See Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners 
Ass’n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 1223, 1234. (Cal. 2004). Amendments are presumed 
enforceable against all owners “unless they are wholly arbitrary, violate a 
fundamental public policy, or impose a burden on the use of affected land that 
far outweighs any benefit.” Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1287. In some jurisdictions 
all amendments and rules properly enacted are clothed with a strong 
presumption of validity unless a plaintiff can show bad faith. See Arabian, 
supra note 133. 
153 A typical approach is uphold any rules and regulations that have been 
enacted by the board, acting within the scope of its authority and not abusing 
its power or acting arbitrarily and capriciously. Unit Owners Ass’n of 
Buildamerica-1 v. Gillman, 292 S.E.2d 378, 386–87 (Va. 1982). This is 
essentially the same approach taken in approving corporate decision-making 
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Judges reason that by buying into a community, owners in a CIC 
have manifested their assent to the terms of the declaration, 
including the procedures for amending its terms.154 Courts 
conclude that by agreeing to amendment procedures, owners 
implicitly agreed to be bound to whatever restrictions a majority 
of their neighbors sees fit to impose in the future.155 
Because community restrictions are subject to majority-rule 
changes, they operate much like a social contract and unlike 
servitudes in the absence of an association or built-in amendment 
procedure.156 In a very real sense, CIC covenants are really 
                                                          
under the Business Judgment Rule. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 
906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006). See also supra notes 65–66 and accompanying 
text. 
154 See, e.g., Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass’n v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452, 
461 (Fla. 2002) (finding that a recorded condominium declaration puts owners 
on notice that the restrictions governing the subject properties are “subject to 
change through the amendment process” and that owners have thereby agreed 
“that they would be bound by properly adopted amendments”); Kroop v. 
Caravelle Condo, Inc., 323 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) 
(upholding amendment prohibiting leasing because “[p]laintiff acquired title to 
her condominium unit with knowledge that the Declaration of Condominium 
might thereafter be lawfully amended”); Hill v. Fontaine Condo. Ass’n, 334 
S.E.2d 690 (Ga. 1985) (an amendment restricting residence to adults only is 
enforceable on all owners); McElveen-Hunter v. Fountain Manor Ass’n, 386 
S.E.2d 435, 436 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), aff’d, 399 S.E.2d 112 (N.C. 1991) 
(holding that an amendment prohibiting leasing “does not infringe upon any 
legal right of the plaintiff’s; for she had notice before the units were bought 
that the declaration was changeable”).  
155 E.g., Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condo. Assn., 146 Cal. Rptr. 695, 700 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Burgess v. Pelkey, 738 A.2d 783, 787 (D.C. 1999); 
Flagler Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Miami v. Crestview Towers Condo. Ass’n, 
595 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Breezy Point Holiday Harbor 
Lodge-Beechside Apt. Owners’ Ass’n v. B.P. P’ship, 531 N.W.2d 917, 920 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Cape May Harbor Vill. & Yacht Club Ass’n v. Sbrag, 
68, 22 A.3d 158, 166 (N.J. App. Div. 2011); Worthinglen Condo. Unit 
Owners’ Ass’n v. Brown, 566 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio App. 1989). C.f., Breene 
v. Plaza Tower Ass’n, 310 N.W.2d 730 (N.D. 1981). 
156 Most CC&R amendments require approval by a supermajority of 
owners. Changes to rules, however, are made by the board of directors for the 
association. This board is elected by majority vote. 
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dynamic governing constitutions. The operation of a CIC 
therefore raises entity governance issues, such as how decisions 
are made, minority voting rights, and limits of governing power.  
Group decision-making can be justified by showing that 
members of the group enjoy sufficient “voice” (or participation) 
and have the ability to “exit” (or leave) if unsatisfied with group 
decisions.157 At first blush, the CIC model seems to pose no 
problem on these grounds. Every owner has a vote (voice) in 
community governance.158 And although owners are bound by 
majority-enacted rules, this presents no real liberty concerns as 
long as owners can “vote with their feet” and leave if dissatisfied 
(exit).159 In the context of corporate governance, exit is the 
relatively simple matter of selling one’s stock. But CIC 
membership is bundled with homeownership and the only way to 
exit is to sell one’s home and move. This makes exit from a CIC 
tremendously burdensome. Real property is quite illiquid; it may 
take quite some time to find a buyer. In addition, it is personally 
and psychologically disruptive to relocate or divest one’s 
homeownership.160 Therefore, although exit is available in theory, 
market and psychological realities create a practical barrier to exit 
in CICs.  
In some cases, restrictive covenants create legal barriers to 
                                                          
157 The terms “voice” and “exit” are borrowed from the corporate 
governance classic, ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 
(1970). 
158 Brower, supra note 20, at 245 (noting that “[p]articipatory consent 
substitutes democratic decision-making and consensus building for state 
regulation over substantive terms”). 
159 Id. at 242 (explaining the argument that assent exists even for 
amendments because dissatisfied owner members in a CIC are always free to 
leave the community if they disagree with its rules). 
160 Id. at 224 (referring to the “financial and psychological stakes raised” 
by requiring a home sale to exit). Much of the impetus behind defaulting 
mortgagor rescue efforts has been the individual harms from forced home 
sales. See Julia Patterson Forrester & Jerome Michael Organ, Promising to Be 
Prudent: A Private Law Approach to Mortgage Loan Regulation in Common-
Interest Communities, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 739, 739 (2012) (calling a 
forced sale of a home “clearly devastating to the homeowner”). 
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CIC exit as well, by limiting an owner’s ability to sell or lease 
her property. Some CIC covenants may provide that property 
transfers can occur only with association consent.161 Others may 
grant the association a first right of refusal with respect to any 
proposed transfer.162 Restrictions on who can occupy a unit and 
prohibitions on leasing of a unit are even more common.163 When 
restrictions constrain an owner’s ability to exit a CIC regime, it 
no longer is valid to say that continued membership or occupancy 
in the private community is truly voluntary and necessarily 
manifests a continuing desire to be bound by the governance 
                                                          
161 E.g., Laguna Royale Owners Ass’n v. Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
162 E.g., Lakeside Manor Condo. Ass’n v. Forehand, 513 So. 2d 1104 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Wolinsky v. Kadison, 449 N.E.2d 151, 155 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1983); Anderson v. 50 E. 72nd St. Condo., 505 N.Y.S.2d 101 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1986), appeal dismissed, 504 N.E.2d 700 (N.Y. 
1987). 
163 Boyack, Community Covenant Alienation Restraints, supra note 33. 
Although limitations on occupancy based on race now are illegal and 
ineffective, for decades racial segregation was upheld as an acceptable way to 
promote the accepted policy goals of high property values and social harmony. 
HARRY GRANT ATKINSON & L.E. FRAILEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF REAL ESTATE 
PRACTICE 428–29 (1946); BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 34; MCKENZIE supra 
note 29, at 60–68; ROBERT C. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO 231 (1948). 
Prior to the 1988 amendment of the Fair Housing Act, many CICs contained 
occupancy restrictions that prohibited residence by children. See, e.g., Ritchey 
v. Villa Nueva Condo. Ass’n, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695, 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); 
Everglades Plaza Condo. Ass’n v. Buckner, 462 So. 2d 835, 837 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1984); Hill v. Fontaine Condo. Ass’n, 334 S.E.2d 690 (Ga. 1985). 
The most common occupancy restraint and alienability restraint in CIC 
covenants today is a restriction on occupancy by non-owner tenants. Katharine 
N. Rosenberry, Home Businesses, Llamas and Aluminum Siding: Trends in 
Covenant Enforcement, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 443, 461–66 (1998); see 
also, e.g., Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Ass’n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 1223, 
1234 (Cal. 2004); Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275 
(Cal. 1994); White Egret Condo., Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 
1979); Flagler Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Miami v. Crestview Towers Condo. 
Ass’n, 595 So. 2d 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); McElveen-Hunter v. 
Fountain Manor Ass’n, 386 S.E.2d 435 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), aff’d, 399 
S.E.2d 112 (N.C. 1991); see also Rawling, supra note 19, at 225. 
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regime. This calls into question the continuing legitimacy of the 
CIC social contract.  
 
D. Covenant Drafting: Authors and Influences 
 
CIC “agreements” consist of non-negotiable covenants that 
have already been drafted and recorded by the developer to create 
a binding servitude on the land before homes are ever sold.164 
This not only informs the reality of homeowner choice, it also 
reveals that none of the community residents actually authors the 
covenants that bind the community. Who, then, dictates these 
adhesive provisions?   
At first blush, the answer seems to be that it is the developer 
who drafts the governing documents, forms the CIC association, 
and records the declaration, but the reality is more complicated.165 
Some market theorists claim that the unilateral act of a developer 
in designing CIC covenants is not troubling because in choosing 
to create a CIC and in crafting the content of community CC&Rs, 
                                                          
164 See MCKENZIE, supra note 29, at 127; supra Part I.B. Prior 
recordation is required to legally sell a condominium unit and is prudent in 
order to create a binding servitude on subsequent property owners. HYATT, 
supra note 4; Winokur, supra note 105. Some early CICs were established 
from existing neighborhoods, and in such cases, homeowners did theoretically 
have some input into a declaration’s content. MCKENZIE, supra note 29, at 33–
36.  
165 See generally WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUMS AND HOME OWNERS 
ASSOCIATIONS: A GUIDE TO THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS (1985) (explaining 
the developer’s process of creating a CIC and explaining how home buyers are 
recipients of, rather than shapers of, the initial servitude regime). In a section 
titled “Developer-Appointed Boards Should Actively Lead the Owners,” Hyatt 
notes: “[M]ost people, by obvious logic, are followers in most aspects of their 
lives—some in virtually all respects. Social order would not be obtained 
without that condition.” See also MCKENZIE supra note 29 at 21, 127 
(describing the developer’s role in establishing CC&Rs and bemoaning lack of 
resident input into the governing terms); Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50, at 
1127–30 (“CIC residents play no direct role in the critical decision-making 
process leading to the organization of the CIC.”); Winokur, supra note 105, at 
58–60 (explaining the complete lack of homeowner input with respect to the 
content of CIC covenants).  
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the developer takes into account consumer preferences as a way 
to maximize sale price.166 This makes sense in theory, but in 
reality, this has never been completely true. Instead, as a 
condition of zoning approval, local municipalities often require 
that a new development be organized as a common interest 
community, and this factor drives CIC creation perhaps more 
than anything else. Furthermore, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
(each a “Government Sponsored Enterprise” or “GSE”),167 and 
the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) indirectly 
determine the content of CIC covenants through their mortgage 
finance underwriting guidelines.168 Because of the influence of 
these government actors, CIC covenants have become 
standardized in the industry and may fail to represent developer 
marketing strategy or consumer preferences.169 
The vast majority of mortgage loans made today are insured 
by the FHA or earmarked for resale to Fannie Mae or Freddie 
Mac.170 The GSEs were at one time private entities but have 
                                                          
166 Forrester & Organ, supra note 160, at 744–45. 
167 Fannie Mae (formerly the Federal National Mortgage Association) and 
Freddie Mac (the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) were chartered 
by Congress and regulated by federal agencies and since 2008 have been in 
conservatorship with the federal government. See Andrea J. Boyack, Laudable 
Goals and Unintended Consequences: The Role and Control of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1489, 1499–1502 (2011) [hereinafter 
Boyack, Laudable Goals] (giving an overview of the market role and 
enumerated purposes of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).  
168 See Boyack, Community Collateral Damage, supra note 2. 
169 Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50; Steven Siegel, The Public Role in 
Establishing Private Residential Communities: Towards A New Formulation of 
Local Government Land Use Policies That Eliminates the Legal Requirements 
to Privatize New Communities in the United States, 38 URB. LAW. 859, 873–
98 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, The Public Role]; see also DILGER, supra note 
106, at 38 (explaining that CICs are “increasingly offering fairly uniform 
levels and types of services.”).  
170 See CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A RESPONSIBLE MARKET FOR HOUSING 
FINANCE: A PROGRESS PLAN TO REFORM THE U.S. SECONDARY MARKET FOR 
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES (2011), available at http://www.american 
progress.org/issues/2011/01/pdf/responsiblemarketforhousingfinance.pdf; see 
also Boyack, Community Collateral Damage, supra note 2, at 82–84, 105–06 
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always been heavily regulated at the federal level and were 
established with an implicit (later explicit) government 
guaranty.171 They exist in order to promote homeownership.172 
But historically and today, the GSEs do more than funnel money 
into the residential mortgage market: through approval 
requirements and form documents, the GSEs and the FHA dictate 
the terms of housing arrangements at every level.173  
In order to qualify for resale to one of the GSEs, a mortgage 
must be secured by an acceptable property. In the CIC context, 
that generally means that the community in which the property is 
located must meet GSE underwriting mandates.174 The 
Department of Housing and Urban Development maintains a list 
of “Approved Condominium Projects,” and typically Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac will only purchase mortgages on units in 
condominiums that are on the approved list.175  
                                                          
(noting that the GSEs and FHA are involved in most new mortgages); Jody 
Shenn & John Gittelsohn, FHA Home-Loan Volume is Sign of “Very Sick 
System,” Agency’s Stevens Says, BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2010), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-24/fha-home-loan-volume-is-sign-of-very-sick-
system-agency-s-stevens-says.html (stating that the FHA and GSEs have been 
financing 90% of home lending since the 2008 market collapse).  
171 See Boyack, Laudable Goals, supra note 167, at 1491; David Reiss, 
The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac’s Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 
1022 (2008). 
172 Boyack, Laudable Goals, supra note 167, at 1495. 
173 In crafting CIC declarations, developers lift language directly from 
government forms and model documents and mirror precisely GSE and FHA 
underwriting requirements. Winokur, supra note 105, at 59. 
174 Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac prohibit any ownership 
concentration in condominiums, meaning that if one owner holds title to 10% 
or more of the units, no unit in the CIC may secure a GSE mortgage. 
Additional requirements include required community majority owner 
occupancy for loans to owner-investors, at least 10% of the association’s 
budget earmarked to fund reserves, and no more than 15% of the members 
being delinquent on paying their assessments. FREDDIE MAC CONDOMINIUM 
UNIT MORTGAGES (July 2013, available at http://www.freddiemac.com/ 
learn/pdfs/uw/condo.pdf; EFANNIEMAE SEC INSTRUMENTS (2014), available 
at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/secinstruments.  
175 See Mortgagee Letter 2009-19 from Brian D. Montgomery, Assistant 
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Communities with a high percentage of non-owner-occupied 
units or a high percentage of members in default on assessment 
payments will not appear on the approved lists and thus will 
likely not qualify for GSE mortgage funds.176 The precise 
threshold percentages vary from time to time, and precise 
mandates of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may differ, but the 
GSEs typically preclude mortgage loans secured by properties in 
CICs where more than 15% of the owners are delinquent in their 
assessments or where more than 50% of units are non-owner-
occupied.177 This latter provision justifies community restrictions 
on leasing. Because of the community owner occupancy 
requirement, standard form declarations provide for various 
levels of control over an owner’s ability to lease, ranging from 
complete or near-complete prohibition of leasing to nearly 
ubiquitous (and GSE/FHA-mandated) restrictions on short-term 
rentals.178 In some contexts it is tricky to comply with both GSE 
owner occupancy standards and the mandates of the FHA, 
                                                          
Sec’y for Hous. Fed. Hous. Comm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to 
All Approved Mortgagees & All FHA Roster Appraisers 1 (June 12, 2009), 
available at http://www.bestfhalender.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/09-
19ml.pdf; Mortgagee Letter 2009-46B from David H. Stevens, Assistant Sec’y 
for Hous. Fed. Hous. Comm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to All 
Approved Mortgagees and All FHA Roster Appraisers 1 (Nov. 6, 2009), 
available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/ 
09-46bml.pdf.  
176 Boyack, Community Collateral Damage, supra note 2, at 105–06. 
177 Until recently, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would not purchase 
mortgages secured by property in CICs with a high percentage of non-owner-
occupied units. FREDDIE MAC, CONDOMINIUM UNIT MORTGAGES 3 (2013), 
available at http://www.freddiemac.com/learn/pdfs/uw/condo.pdf; Mortgagee 
Letter 2012-18 from Carol J. Galante, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Hous. Fed. 
Hous. Comm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to All Approved 
Mortgagees & All FHA Roster Appraisers 6–10 (Sep. 13, 2012), available at 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=12-18ml.pdf. Recently, 
the underwriting requirements with respect to community owner-occupancy 
have been softened for purchasers intending to become owner occupants 
themselves. Nevertheless, for decades, CIC owner-occupancy levels have been 
factors in mortgage funding decisions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
178 See supra notes 166–71 and accompanying text.  
2014.04.25 BOYACK.DOCX 5/19/2014  11:27 AM 
 COMMUNITY COVENANT CONTRACT MYTH 817 
 
however. The FHA views a complete ban on leasing as an 
unlawful restraint on alienation, but the GSEs require high 
community owner occupancy rates. Because of this, conventional 
wisdom in crafting CIC declarations is to prohibit most—but not 
all—units from being leased.179 This allows a CIC to walk the line 
between running afoul of the FHA rules and disqualifying the 
community from GSE investment.  
Complying with the underwriting requirements of Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHA can make or break a CIC 
project. Properties in qualifying communities have access to 
vastly more mortgage capital, and liquidity bolsters property 
values. Conversely, property in a community with too many 
tenants or too many assessment-delinquent owners will be cut off 
from mortgage funds, decreasing the property’s liquidity and 
market price and perhaps even rendering the property 
unsellable.180 Developers across the nation want their products 
sold for the highest prices and therefore need their would-be 
buyers to have access to the requisite funds. This requires that the 
developers will frame the CC&Rs to match the guidelines of the 
GSEs and the FHA whenever possible.181  
                                                          
179 See, e.g., ELIA B. GILBERT, FHA CONDOMINIUM CERTIFICATIONS:  
THE REQUIREMENTS AND THE PROHIBITIONS, available at http://www. 
hindmansanchez.com/sites/default/files/resources/FHA%20Condominium 
%20Certifications%20The%20Requirements%20and%20Prohibitions.pdf; 
Matt McMullin, FHA Approval and Rental Restrictions—A Curious 
Relationship, VIAL FOTHERINGHAM LLP (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.vf-
law.com/articles/fha-information; Jim Slaughter, FHA Guidelines & 
Condominium Rental Restrictions, ROSSABI BLACK SLAUGHTER, PA (Mar. 1, 
2013), http://www.lawfirmrbs.com/blog/fha-guidelines-condominium-rental-
restrictions/. It is literally possible to satisfy both GSE and FHA requirements 
of CIC covenants provided that only one unit may be rented at any time.  
180 This sets up a strange dichotomy: in communities with no-leasing 
covenants, owners cannot legally rent, but in communities without such 
covenants, too many neighborhood rentals will make it practically impossible 
for an owner to sell. The existence of GSE guidelines on owner occupancy 
thus necessarily restricts (practically if not legally) the owners’ ability to 
transfer. For a more detailed discussion of this conundrum, see Boyack, 
Community Collateral Damage, supra note 2. 
181 See Winokur, supra note 105, at 59.  
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Because meeting FHA and GSE requirements is so vital to 
community success, changes to entity and agency policies can 
rapidly and effectively impact covenant content for future CICs. 
One such example is how new policies of the GSEs and FHA 
rapidly changed the use of private transfer fees (PTF) covenants 
in CC&Rs. Over the past decade, many developers started 
including PTF covenants in CC&Rs as a way to defer and 
privatize payment of today’s development costs.182 PTF covenants 
require that a fee equal to a percentage of the sale price be paid 
either to the association or to a designated third party as a 
condition of property resale.183 More than eleven million homes 
are currently encumbered by PTF covenants.184 
Innovators of such PTF covenants claim that these covenants 
keep housing affordable by temporally spreading the ballooning 
costs of development.185 Mimicking the traditional freedom of 
                                                          
182 For example, between 2001 and 2006, Lennar Corporation included 
PTF covenants into CC&Rs governing 13,000 homes in California. These 
PTFs are payable to the Lennar Charitable Housing Foundation. See Robbie 
Wheelan, Home-Resale Fees Under Attack, WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487033149045753992905
11802382. In New York, Freehold Partners crafted a creative solution to 
building costs by entering into agreements with developers to buy the right to 
collect PTFs in exchange for upfront development fees. Freehold then 
securitized the obligations by pooling and selling shares in the aggregate 
income stream from PTFs. Id. (“Municipalities have long used similar fees, 
called transfer taxes, to raise revenues or recoup public subsidies for private 
development projects, but private transfer fees are relatively new.”). For an 
excellent and thorough discussion of PTFs, see R. Wilson Freyermuth, Private 
Transfer Fee Covenants: Cleaning Up the Mess, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. 
L.J. 419 (2010). 
183 Freyermuth supra note 182; see also Richard Mansfield, Private 
Transfer Fee Covenants: A Thing of the Past?, WORLDWIDE ERC  
(Feb. 7, 2011, 10:32 AM), http://www.worldwideerc.org/Blogs/Mobility 
LawBlog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=c020aee5%2D48ad%2D47b2%2D8295
%2Da4cf71ba9e34&ID=57 (explaining how PTFs work and when they came 
into use). 
184 Burke T. Ward & Jamie P. Hopkins, Private Transfer Fees: Developer 
Exploitation or Legitimate Financing Vehicle?, 56 VILL. L. REV. 901, 901 
(2012). 
185 See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, LEARN HOW CAPITAL  
2014.04.25 BOYACK.DOCX 5/19/2014  11:27 AM 
 COMMUNITY COVENANT CONTRACT MYTH 819 
 
contract rationale in CIC oversight cases, PTF proponents argue 
that PTF covenants are not unfair because buyers in CICs, by the 
very act of purchasing the property in the first place, have agreed 
to pay these resale fees in the future.186 But many buyers, policy 
makers, and legislatures objected to an imposition of a long-term 
private tax on transfers of property, particularly when the 
proceeds of such fees went to private investors.187 At least thirty-
six states responded to the advent of PTFs by passing laws 
limiting their validity,188 typically channeling PTF proceeds to 
community associations and prohibiting payment of PTFs to 
private for-profit third parties.189  
It is recognized that state governments can pass statutes to 
directly prohibit certain types of covenant restrictions. The 
federal government’s ability to control the content of CIC 
                                                          
RECOVERY FEE INSTRUMENTS CAN HELP YOU, available at 
http://www.freeholdcapitalpartners.com/forms/freehold_brochure.pdf 
[hereinafter FREEHOLD CAPITAL]. 
186 The act supposedly manifesting assent to the PTF covenants included 
in recorded CC&Rs was the home purchase. Ward & Hopkins, supra note 
184, at 902; see also Freyermuth, supra note 182 (explaining the problematic 
aspects of inferring consent in this way). One law review article considering 
the issue of PTF covenants contends that buyers would simply decrease their 
offer price when purchasing property burdened by PTF covenants in 
recognition of their obligation to pay in the future, but there is no indication 
that buyers actually do this. Ward & Hopkins, supra note 184, at 913–16 
(arguing that every buyer “willingly agrees to buy the property knowing, at 
least constructively, about the existence of the PTF” and can adjust their price 
accordingly (emphasis added)). The authors advocate for a stronger disclosure 
approach to PTF enforceability. Id. 
187 Id. The Coalition to Stop Home Resale Fees asserted that PTFs are 
“Wall Street lining their pockets while stealing equity from homeowners.” 
Wheelan, supra note 182. Most PTFs are not designed to exist in perpetuity, 
but rather provide an expiration date, typically 99 years. Mansfield, supra note 
183; Ward & Hopkins supra note 184. 
188 By 2011, 36 states had passed some limiting legislation with respect to 
PTFs. Ward & Hopkins, supra note 184, at 902.  
189 Only a handful of regulating states prohibit PTFs. Most of the 
legislative focus has been on to whom the fees are paid, not whether the fees 
are payable. Id. California’s statutory fix permits all types of PTFs but 
mandates special disclosures. Mansfield, supra note 183. 
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covenants, however, is less obvious. No federal agency has the 
authority to ban certain types of covenants from CIC 
declarations, but the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)190 
can achieve this indirectly. The FHFA controls the actions of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The FHFA regulates the GSEs, 
and GSE underwriting requirements drive CIC structuring. When 
the FHFA tells the GSE to refrain from purchasing mortgages 
secured by property burdened by certain types of restrictions, it 
indirectly—but tremendously effectively—mandates the content of 
CIC covenants.191 In March 2012, the FHFA published a rule 
prohibiting Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home 
Loan Banks from purchasing mortgages on properties 
encumbered by PTFs payable to third parties.192 This FHFA 
regulation has been tremendously effective, virtually wiping out 
privately directed PTF covenants in CICs formed after March 
                                                          
190 The FHFA was created by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 
2008. See Pub. L. No.110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12, 15, 26, 37, 38, and 42 U.S.C.A.). The primary 
purpose of FHFA is to regulate Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal 
Home Loan Banks. 
191 One commentator opined that the FHFA regulation “virtually 
guarantees that [PTFs] will be used no more.” Bobby Saadieh, FHFA’s Final 
Ruling Will Restrict Private Transfer Fees, PERTRIA (Apr. 12, 2012, 11:04 
AM), http://www.pertria.com/2012/fhfas-final-ruling-will-restrict-private-
transfer-fees-2/. 
192 FHFA Restrictions, 12 C.F.R. § 1228 (2012). The FHFA rule does 
not address PTFs payable to a community association. The FHFA rule also 
excludes PTFs paid to certain tax-exempt organizations that use the PTF 
proceeds to benefit the property, but includes any fees not allocated to property 
improvement and upkeep. Id. The rule also applies only prospectively (from its 
announcement in 2011), and thus impacts CIC declarations recorded after that 
time, but not any of the previously recorded CC&Rs that included PTF 
provisions. Id.; see also Mansfield, supra note 183 (explaining that this rule 
will not affect the thousands of existing mortgages for deeds containing a PTF 
covenant). For further discussion of the FHFA rule, see Announcement SEL-
2012-05, SELLING GUIDE (Fannie Mae, Washington, D.C.), June 19, 2012, at 
1, available at https://www.fanniemae.com/content/announcement/ 
sel1205.pdf . Freehold Capital, however, estimates that over $600 billion worth 
of PTF securities are currently in commerce. FREEHOLD CAPITAL, supra note 
185. 
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2012. This example provides an interesting glimpse into how 
federal agency action can directly impact the content of “private” 
CC&Rs.  
Locally, municipalities can also impact covenant communities 
by requiring a CIC structure in exchange for granting zoning 
approval for new projects.193 Since zoning approval is a 
prerequisite to creating a new community, local regulators’ 
preferences, with respect to the existence and content of CC&Rs, 
are incorporated whenever possible. In mandating covenant 
substance, many municipalities adhere to the FHA guidelines 
with respect to CIC structuring.194 Financial realities motivate 
municipal requirements as well. Local governments have long 
realized that the CIC ownership structure can be used as a vehicle 
for privatizing traditional municipal functions.195 The greater the 
percentage of community amenities and upkeep that can be 
channeled to private community maintenance, the better for the 
municipal budget. 
These external influences on the content of CIC covenants is 
obscured by continued judicial assertions that such covenants 
represent the private contractual choices of the residents in a 
given community.196 In reality, covenant terms do not necessarily 
                                                          
193 See Siegel, The Public Role, supra note 169, at 877–95 (calling the 
CIC ownership concept as “a form of ‘grand bargain’ between developers and 
municipalities” and citing to several local zoning statutes that require use of 
the CIC form). 
194 The FHA prescribes numerous “initial” terms for CC&Rs and also 
strongly advocates the imposition of supermajority requirements to amend CIC 
governing documents. Such supermajority requirements attempt to promote 
predictability preferred by FHA insurers and “prevent owners from banding 
together.” MCKENZIE, supra note 29, at 127. These “recommendations” are 
backed with the possibility of FHA mortgage insurance and have been widely 
followed. Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50, at 1114. 
195 TREESE ET AL., supra note 42, at 3; Boyack, Community Collateral 
Damage, supra note 2, at 60; Siegel, The Public Role, supra note 169, at 879. 
196  Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50, at 1112 (the “CIC phenomenon is, 
increasingly, the direct product of conscious and deliberate government policy 
. . . .”). The CIC covenant situation is an example of an adhesion contract 
drafted by neither party to the transaction, “where the terms are proffered by a 
third party and both contracting parties are reduced to the humble role of 
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represent homeowner will in any real sense.197 Rather, CIC 
covenants are more likely to reflect the extent to which a 
developer acquiesces to municipal requirements and follows FHA 
and GSE underwriting “guidance.”198  
 
III. A LEGAL-HYBRID APPROACH TO CICS 
 
A. Refocusing Freedom of Contract Policy 
 
CIC covenants are legal hybrids, not contracts. Servitude law 
determines their duration and enforceability, and their functions 
approximate association governance or even, to some extent, 
public local governments. Because CIC covenants are real 
property servitudes that create dynamic private community 
governance systems—not mere contracts—contract law should not 
create a basically un-rebuttable presumption of validity.199  The 
                                                          
adherent.” Andrew A. Schwartz, Consumer Contract Exchanges and the 
Problem of Adhesion, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 346 (2011). 
197 To the contrary, numerous studies have shown that homeowners are 
dissatisfied with the content of their community covenants and, as a general 
rule, the provisions of CC&Rs diverge markedly from community preferences. 
Winokur, supra note 105, at 63 n.260–61; see also STEPHEN E. BARTON & 
CAROL J. SILVERMAN, CAL. DEP’T OF REAL ESTATE, COMMON INTEREST 
HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS MANAGEMENT STUDY (1987). A report 
published by the Urban Land Institute found that a majority of residents in 
CICs were greatly dissatisfied with their community. CAROL NORCROSS, 
TOWNHOUSES & CONDOMINIUMS: RESIDENTS’ LIKES AND DISLIKES 80 (1973). 
The report characterized residents as “unhappy, resentful, discouraged, and 
disillusioned about their associations,” with “[a] considerable number of 
families . . . so angry that they are selling their homes and moving away . . . 
to get away from what they think of as strait-jacket controls on their lives.” Id. 
198 NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR.,. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN PLANNING 
LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 49.2 (rev. ed. 2013) (explaining 
that in a CIC, “the actual decisions on land use and building forms in the 
district, and perhaps also on density, are explicitly to be made, not by a 
general public policy adopted in advance, but by negotiation between the 
municipality and the developer”); Siegel, The Public Role, supra note 169, at 
879–80. 
199 Contracts voluntarily entered into should be enforceable 
notwithstanding unfairness created by their terms. Economic and liberty theory 
2014.04.25 BOYACK.DOCX 5/19/2014  11:27 AM 
 COMMUNITY COVENANT CONTRACT MYTH 823 
 
economic justifications for presumptive enforcement of contracts 
voluntarily entered into do not always apply to CIC covenants. 
Unlike voluntary contracts, CIC covenants are not necessarily 
freely chosen by owners who voluntarily elect to be bound by 
their terms. Autonomy and efficiency policy goals, therefore, are 
not necessarily promoted by CIC covenant enforcement. 
Promoting the underlying values that freedom of contract 
represents should inform the decision of whether to enforce CIC 
governing acts, but CIC covenants and regulations should not be 
upheld simply based on the rhetoric of freedom of contract as an 
end in and of itself. At a minimum, an owner’s overt act 
specifically manifesting assent should be prerequisite to being 
bound to the provisions of community CC&Rs. In addition, 
unlike contracts, courts and legislators should protect the public 
interest by limiting CIC governance’s permissible subject matter 
and scope. To summarily validate private community regulations 
as if they were mere contract provisions does not necessarily 
promote the values of autonomy and efficiency. To the contrary, 
in some cases, it threatens these same values. 
Freedom to voluntarily obligate oneself in contract to terms of 
one’s choice is a paramount and protected legal right allocated to 
capable parties in our society.200 Each person with this freedom to 
                                                          
justifies this result. Treating CIC covenants as if they were contracts freely 
chosen by the members who are bound by their terms, however, does not 
necessarily promote autonomy and efficiency. 
200 Courts in Ohio, for example, have called freedom of contract 
“fundamental to our society.” Royal Indem. Co. v. Baker Protective Servs., 
Inc., 515 N.E.2d 5 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (citations omitted). Freedom of 
contract is a constitutionally protected liberty right. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). U.S. case law is replete with citations to freedom 
of contract as a primary public policy underlying the law. See, e.g., Venegas 
v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 87 (1990) (requiring, and not finding, specific 
direction by Congress to limit freedom of contract); Chambers Dev. Co. v. 
Passaic Cnty. Utilities Auth., 62 F.3d 582, 589 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The sanctity 
of a contract is a fundamental concept of our entire legal structure. Freedom of 
contract includes the freedom to make a bad bargain.”); City & Cnty. of 
Denver v. The Dist. Court of Denver, 939 P.2d 1353, 1361 (Colo. 1997) 
(“The right of parties to contract freely is well developed in our 
jurisprudence.”); DeVetter v. Principal Mutual Life Ins., 516 N.W.2d 792, 
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contract has the power to be his or her own legislature and create 
binding obligations that will be enforced by the court.201 Freedom 
of contract is a universal concept, a key characteristic of almost 
every legal system.202 The principle that agreements are binding is 
the cornerstone of international law203 and one of the fundamental 
precepts in our political philosophy.204 
Freedom of contract theory requires voluntary assent, and 
enforcement of private agreements is predicated on personal 
autonomy both with respect to choosing to be bound in obligation 
                                                          
794 (Iowa 1994) (opining that freedom to contract is a “weighty societal 
interest”); Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 89 (Kan. 1996) (“The paramount 
public policy is that freedom to contract is not to be interfered with lightly.”) 
(citation omitted). 
201 See, e.g., RICHARD CRASWELL & ALAN SCHWARTZ, FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONTRACT LAW (2012); ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT 
LAW (1997); Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1283 (1990); Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The 
Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 
IOWA L. REV. 769, 825 (1985). 
202 All common law jurisdictions have cases that reiterate the primacy of 
the principle of freedom of contract. See, e.g., News Ltd. v. Austl. Rugby 
Football League Ltd. (1996) 135 ALR 33 (Austl.) (explaining judicial 
hesitancy to “interfere with the general freedom of contract under the law”). 
Freedom of contract is a foundational piece of European contract law and the 
contract jurisprudence of all EU Member States of the European Union.  See 
THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, art. 1:102 (2002).  
203 The Justinian Code made much of pacta sunt servanda (the concept that 
agreements are binding). K.M. Sharma, From “Sanctity” to “Fairness”: An 
Uneasy Transition in the Law of Contracts?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 95, 97 (1999); see also United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, April 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (1988) 
(setting forth the general principles for international transactions); I.I. 
Lukashuk, The Principle Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Nature of Obligation 
Under International Law, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 513 (1989) (explaining the 
principle that treaty obligations must be fulfilled as a baseline concept in 
international law).  
204 Western capitalist countries, especially the United States, adhere more 
strongly to freedom of contract principles in their purest, least constrained 
form. See P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 10 
(1985). 
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and with respect to choosing the parameters of that obligation.205 
Freedom of contract meshes well with American primacy of 
personal freedom and capitalist economic theory of market self-
regulation that considers each contracting party the best judge of 
his or her own interests.206 In addition, many commentators 
believe that allowing individuals the power to contract as they 
choose, substantially free from regulatory interference or 
oversight, advances liberty interests.207 Economic theory also 
posits that optimal efficiency results when individuals may 
contract freely,208 and that judicial protection of the future 
                                                          
205 See REINHARD ZIMMERMAN, THE NEW GERMAN LAW OF 
OBLIGATIONS: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 205 (2005) 
(“[F]reedom of contract is not an end in itself. Rather, it must be regarded as a 
means of promoting the self-determination of those who wish to conclude a 
contract.”).  
206 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner, eds., 1982); see also 
G.H. TREITEL, AN OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 3–5 (6th ed. 2005) 
(“[L]aissez-faire” economic theory advises that government “do nothing, and 
let the market resolve any problem that arises.”). 
207 Richard Epstein calls freedom of contract an essential aspect of 
individual liberty, guaranteeing “to individuals a sphere of influence in which 
they will be able to operate, without having to justify themselves to the state or 
to third parties.” Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical 
Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 293–94 (1975) [hereinafter Epstein, 
Unconscionability]. According to theories of autonomy and individual will, it 
is empowering to grant contracting parties quasi-legislative powers inter se. 
See, e.g., BRIAN A. BLUM, CONTRACTS § 1.4.1 (6th ed. 2013) (“The power to 
enter contracts and to formulate the terms of the contractual relationship is . . . 
an integral part of personal liberty.”); E. Allan Farnsworth, The Past of 
Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 576 
(1969) (drawing parallels between legislation and contract). 
208 See FREDERICH A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND 
ECONOMICS 91–92, 96–105 (1978); POSNER, supra note 100, at 48–49. 
Although widely accepted throughout the twentieth century, the efficient 
market hypothesis has come under fire during the most recent financial crisis, 
with some theorists blaming free markets for creating the real estate bubble 
that sparked a global financial meltdown in 2008. Other theorists opine that it 
was the interference with the free market that created systemic volatility. For a 
brief overview of these competing viewpoints, see David Shay Corbett II, Free 
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expectations created by contracts increases societal wealth.209  
Even though freedom of a contract is an aspect of personal 
liberty, all contract enforceability presents a temporal autonomy 
paradox. An individual who exercises her freedom of contract 
today binds her future self, necessarily limiting her later 
freedom.210 Future freedom limitations are only justified because 
they are voluntarily chosen. Protections against involuntary 
contracting ensure that a party’s freedom is only restricted to the 
extent that she so chooses.211 Furthermore, the policy of allowing 
contractual non-performance in exchange for payment of 
compensatory damages ameliorates concerns about limitations of 
one’s future freedom.212 Efficiency policy supports the contract 
damages approach as well, justifying not only a party’s freedom 
                                                          
Markets and Government Regulation: The Competing Views of Thomas 
Woods and George Cooper, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 547 (2010). 
209 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA STUDY 10, 
22–23 (2011). Wealth maximization through contract enforcement is a 
foundational concept in the law. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE 
MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 157 (2000) (“Law is the instrument that fixes and 
realizes capital.”); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. 
REV. 553, 562–63 (1933) (“[A] regime in which contracts are freely made and 
generally enforced gives greater scope to individual initiative and thus 
promotes the greatest wealth of a nation.”). 
210 See Winokur, supra note 105, at 50 (explaining this concept in terms 
of Ulysses tying himself to his ship’s mast, deliberately robbing his future self 
of the freedom to react to the sirens’ song).  
211 For example, the doctrines of duress, undue influence, 
unconscionability, incapacity, and fraud all protect a contracting party from 
involuntarily limiting her future freedom of action. 
212 Courts generally award expectation damages for a breach of contract 
equal to the economic difference between what the non-breaching party 
expected to obtain from the breaching party’s performance and what actually 
was obtained (plus foreseeable costs resulting from the breach and less any 
cost savings from avoiding reciprocal performance and from mitigation). The 
theory behind expectation damages has been explained as best approximating 
the value of both retrospective and prospective reliance and as the economic 
equivalent of the bargained-for interest of the contracting parties. See David 
W. Barnes, The Net Expectation Interest in Contract Damages, 48 EMORY L.J. 
1137, 1139 (1999); L. L. Fuller & William R. Purdue, Jr., The Reliance 
Interest in Contract Damages (Pt. 1), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 57–62 (1936).  
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to enter a contract but also her freedom to breach the contract 
upon paying the non-breaching party’s expectation interest.213  
Freedom to breach a contract and pay damages is a widely touted 
American innovation that supports the dual values of efficiency 
and personal liberty, and mitigates the temporal autonomy 
paradox of contract law.214 Although continuing to be obligated to 
the financial effect of a contract, contracting parties typically can 
use breach to exit the contracting relationship.215 The voluntary 
manifestation of assent requirement coupled with contract law’s 
approach to damages adequately ensures both freedom and 
efficiency in a typical contract context. 
The same values that underlie freedom of contract theory can 
only justify the enforcement of CIC covenants if there is a higher 
threshold of true assent. Because CIC covenant terms are more 
durable than contracts and are specifically enforceable, the 
possibility of breach and the passage of time do not ameliorate 
their effect. Actual informed assent is therefore even more vital 
                                                          
213 In the late nineteenth century, Oliver Wendell Holmes posited that 
breach of contract is viewed by the law as “amoral,” and is essentially an 
option purchased through payment of expectation damages. Holmes, supra 
note 118, at 462. Theorists of the law and economics school have seized upon 
this concept and expanded it into the theory of efficient breach, holding that “it 
is uneconomical to induce completion of performance of a contract after it has 
been broken” and explaining that the law should encourage (or at least not 
discourage) any breach that is “efficient.” POSNER, supra note 100, at 149–51.  
214 The default remedy in contract breach actions in the United States is a 
monetary award of expectation damages, but under civil law, breach of 
contract is typically remedied by an order of specific performance rather than a 
monetary calculation of damages. See Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. 
Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d 385, 389 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 
U.S. 1068 (2003) (“[T]he civil law grants specific performance in breach of 
contract cases as a matter of course.”).  
215 Breach as a tool for flexibility justifies other aspects of contract law 
such as judicial reluctance to excuse an obligation based on changed 
circumstances, judicial scrutiny of penalizing liquidated damages provisions, 
and judicial reluctance to order specific performance. See John D. Wladis, 
Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development of the Doctrine of 
Impossibility of Performance in English Common Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1575 
(1987). 
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in the context of private community covenants.216 In addition, 
because the key act of assent drives obligation under the dynamic 
governing process, and because individual opt-out is not possible 
in a CIC (absent sale of the home), the law should require that 
the amendment and rulemaking processes be specifically known 
by and explicitly agreed to by owners from the start.217 This can 
be accomplished through (a) requiring homeowners to 
demonstrate a separate manifestation of intent to be bound by the 
CIC, apart from the mere purchase of a parcel of real property 
located in a given community, and (b) through  mandating a more 
effective (earlier, more accessible) disclosure of community 
covenants and rules.218 
Public policy restraints in contract law also offer some ideas 
about how to deal with covenants and rules that impact other 
important social policies. While courts generally uphold contracts 
regardless of their content, there is some degree of judicial 
suspicion with respect to certain contractual provisions such as 
limitations on a party’s autonomy with respect to future 
contracting or future breach, limits on free trade, and barriers to 
free alienation.219 For example, although parties might agree 
today that no modification to a contract will be binding unless 
                                                          
216 See Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 697 (2010) (discussing incomplete consumer notice and barriers to 
effective modification in CICs). 
217 For a discussion of how property purchase is deemed assent to current 
as well as future terms of community governing documents and association 
acts, see supra notes 50–93, 164–73, and accompanying text. 
218 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has been pioneering efforts 
to increase the effectiveness of consumer disclosures in the context of 
mortgage lending. A similar effort should drive qualitative improvements of 
CIC disclosures to homebuyers.  
219 While some contracts are deemed unenforceable on substantive public 
policy grounds, this is a rather exceptional result. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 (1981); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 
§ 5.1 (4th ed. 2004); see also Swaverly v. Freeway Ford Truck Sales, 700 
N.E.2d 181 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (finding that public policy strongly favors 
freedom to contract and enforcement should only be avoided if a contract 
clearly contravenes articulated public policy). 
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that agreement is evidenced by a signed writing, if parties later 
agree to orally modify the contract, the later oral modification 
will still be enforced at common law.220 In spite of the general 
hands-off approach to the subject matter of contracts, courts do 
police contractual promises not to compete based on public policy 
concerns regarding market freedom and an individual’s right to 
earn a livelihood.221 Contractual promises designed to have the in 
terrorem effect of discouraging breach, in the form of penalizing 
liquidated damages clauses, are likewise subject to judicial 
restraint and invalidation.222 And limitations on property 
alienability have been legally suspect for hundreds of years.223 
                                                          
220 See, e.g., Barinaga v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 
1164, 1173 (D. Or. 2010); Truhe v. Turnac Grp. L.L.C., 599 N.W.2d 378, 
383 (S.D. 1999). Statutory provisions have modified this general rule, and the 
Uniform Commercial Code specifically departs from the common law in 
making no oral modification clauses presumptively enforceable. U.C.C. § 2-
209(2) (2012). 
221 Historically, covenants not to compete were held to be invalid 
restraints on trade. See Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 
1281 (Ariz. 1999). Courts will, however, enforce non-compete provisions that 
are determined to be reasonable in scope. See, e.g., Estee Lauder Companies, 
Inc. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Ohio Urology, Inc. 
v. Poll, 594 N.E.2d 1027, 1031–32 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).  
222 See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated 
Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an 
Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 
554 (1977).  
223 See Michael D. Kirby, Comment, Restraints on Alienation: Placing A 
13th Century Doctrine in 21st Century Perspective, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 413, 
413 (1988) (“Without doubt, the concept of free alienability is a cornerstone of 
modern Anglo-American civilization . . . .”); Merrill I. Schnebly, Restraints 
Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests: I, 44 YALE L.J. 961, 961 (1935) 
(“Since an early date in the history of the English common law, it has been 
thought socially and economically desirable that the owner of a present fee 
simple in land, or of a corresponding absolute interest in chattels, should have 
the power to transfer his interest.”). The Restatement (Second) of Property 
asserts that “[m]uch of modern property law operates on the assumption that 
freedom to alienate property interests which one may own is essential to the 
welfare of society.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP., DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS PART II, Introductory Note (1981); see also RESTATEMENT 
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Correctly interpreting and applying public policy constraints on 
CIC covenants is vital to ensuring the proper scope and role of 
private community governing rules.  
Another issue involving CIC covenants is their presumptive 
specific enforceability. Specifically enforcing covenants 
regardless of their impact on community preferences and their 
economic costs is an unwarranted dilution of owners’ and, in 
some cases, non-owners’ liberty.224 Only in cases where parties 
have actually and voluntarily agreed to provisions that restrain 
important freedoms should courts specifically enforce these sorts 
of covenants. Over-reliance on the form of freedom of contract 
without requiring actual assent undermines both autonomy and 
efficiency—the very social values that freedom of contract is 
designed to promote.225  
There has been much scholarship endorsing a hands-off 
judicial enforcement of CIC covenants based on the wholesale 
application of freedom of contract theory.226 But this approach is 
                                                          
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186(1) (1981) (“A promise is unenforceable on 
grounds of public policy if it is unreasonably in restraint of trade.”); JOHN 
CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION  OF PROPERTY §§ 15–18 (2d 
ed. 1895) (citing to thirteenth and fourteenth centuries hostility toward 
restraints on alienation); George M. Cohen, The Financial Crisis and the 
Forgotten Law of Contracts, 87 TUL. L. REV. 1, 37 (2012) (“Contract law has 
long had a rule that contracts in restraint of trade are unenforceable because 
they are inconsistent with the ideal of freedom of contract.”).  
224 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 100, at 32; Steven N.S. Cheung, 
Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual 
Arrangements, 12 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1969); Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain 
Alienation?, 85 COLUMBIA L. REV. 970 (1985) [hereinafter Epstein, Why 
Restrain Alienation?]; Winokur, supra note 105, at 25; Boyack, Community 
Covenant Alienation Restraints, supra note 33.  
225 Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50. C.f. Epstein, Covenants and 
Constitutions, supra note 80, at 922–25 (arguing that covenants should be 
presumptively enforceable against buyers with constructive notice because 
freedom of contract should be the lens through which to view a servitude 
regime). 
226 See, e.g., Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A 
Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights in Existing 
Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828 (1999) (“[E]conomic forces 
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justified if, and only if, the “agreement” to CIC governance 
really fits the traditional concept of a voluntary assent. If a 
contact provision truly reflects party will and intent to be bound, 
and if the obligation only lasts a “reasonable time,” and if it 
imposes no unwarranted costs on third parties, then a freedom of 
contract justification is quite compelling.227 But in reality, many 
modern CC&Rs do not promote the autonomy and liberty values 
behind freedom of contract.228 They are not really products of 
party intent to be bound, they presumptively last in perpetuity, 
and they impact personal freedoms of contract parties and non-
parties. Because of this covenant-contract disconnect, freedom of 
contract theory provides insufficient justification for the negative 
externalities that certain types of CIC restrictions impose.  
 
B. Limiting Servitude Scope 
 
In addition to setting a higher assent threshold in the context 
of CC&Rs, the law should revitalize the concept of a substantive 
limit on CIC covenants beyond the outer limit of public policy. 
Traditional servitude law provided this sort of limitation on 
covenants scope: the touch and concern test.229 But years of 
stretching this test to address all manner of restrictions has 
                                                          
. . . made private neighborhood associations the choice for millions of people 
for their residential property.”); Laura T. Rahe, The Right to Exclude: 
Preserving the Autonomy of the Homeowners’ Association, 34 URB. LAW. 
521, 552 (2002) (“[T]he homeowners’ association” is properly viewed as “the 
product of individual [consumer] choices.”).  
227 See Kirby, supra note 223, at 429 (finding that courts “have not 
adequately examined freedom of contract and its relationship to promissory 
restraints” and concluding that “if two parties contract that a particular 
property will not be subject to sale for some reasonable time” then such 
agreement should be upheld). 
228 See, e.g., Evan McKenzie, Reinventing Common Interest 
Developments: Reflections on a Policy Role for the Judiciary, 31 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 397, 421–22 (1998) (advocating for a higher threshold of 
buyer consent, particularly with respect to covenants that impact an owner’s 
basic rights). 
229 See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text. 
2014.04.25 BOYACK.DOCX 5/19/2014  11:27 AM 
832 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
 
deprived it of any real meaning, and several modern scholars 
have called for its abolition. Yet there remain compelling reasons 
to have some sort of more restrictive substantive limit in the law 
of real covenants beyond the public policy limitation of contract 
law. Opting out is not an option in CICs. Breach does not 
terminate obligation and a party cannot elect damages in lieu of 
performance. Changing covenant terms is cumbersome at best 
and impossible in some cases. Thus, there is a great need to have 
some initial control of the legitimate subject matter for 
regulations of private community covenants.  
At the other end of the spectrum from those who call for 
hands-off enforcement of all CIC covenants in the name of 
freedom of contract are CIC naysayers who condemn this entire 
system of property ownership and private governance. But calling 
for elimination of condominiums, planned developments, and 
association governance goes much too far. CIC governance 
serves legitimate social functions. It provides a workable solution 
to the tragedy of the commons, allowing shared neighborhood 
amenities and common areas. It creates effective ways to combat 
community nuisances caused by use incompatibilities.230 And it 
can (perhaps only theoretically in some cases) foster engagement 
and involvement at a local, grassroots level in community 
problems, planning, and coalescence. In order to preserve the 
                                                          
230 Nuisance law is notoriously difficult to apply and necessitates ad hoc 
decisions of reasonableness of a given use, leading to erratic results. Rose, 
supra note 30, at 5. Prosser famously called the law of nuisance an 
“impenetrable jungle.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 86 (5th ed. 1984). See also Boyack, Community 
Covenant Alienation Restraints, supra note 33; Winokur, supra note 105, at 
37. Prior to the advent of association governance, restrictive covenants would 
only be enforced if an individual owner chose to sue for enforcement in court. 
Such owner would bear the costs of this lawsuit, but all owners in the 
community would benefit from having the covenant enforced. See MCKENZIE, 
supra note 29, at 35; Marc A. Weiss & John W. Watts, Community Builders 
and Community Associations: The Role of Real Estate Developers in Private 
Residential Governance, in ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS, RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS 98 (1989). This was yet 
another manifestation of the freeriding problem and generally discouraged 
legal enforcement of such ungoverned covenant regimes. 
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effectiveness and value of these functions, CIC intrusion into 
illegitimate spheres—such as those that impact important personal 
freedoms or are not justified by neighbors’ economic interests—
should be disallowed. 
The challenge comes in distinguishing justifiable realms of 
community governance from unwarranted incursions of private 
regulatory power. Because community servitudes can provide a 
workable solution to neighborhood nuisances, limitations on 
property use should be presumptively within the proper scope of 
CIC covenants and association governance, particularly with 
respect to uses that create cost externalities.  
Other permissible areas of community governance relate to 
the valuable CIC function of solving two economic failures of 
common property: first, regulation of common areas to prevent 
overuse, and second, requiring affirmative contribution to 
common area upkeep to prevent freeriding. It is therefore 
legitimate for CIC covenants to address the uses of both common 
and individual property in the community. And CICs should also 
be empowered to mandate pro rata owner assessment 
contributions, take actions to collect these assessments, and 
ensure the upkeep of common areas.231 Solving the “tragedy of 
the commons”232 in terms of overuse and freeriding has been one 
of the tremendous contributions that CICs have made.233 CICs 
reap societal gains in encouraging community amenities, 
providing for fair allocation of maintenance costs, and arbitrating 
between use incompatibilities. Covenants addressing use, upkeep, 
                                                          
231 Most associations’ governing documents explicitly provide for 
assessment funding of association obligations. See HYATT, supra note 4, at 
105, 108. Where covenants do not so provide, courts have liberally implied the 
power to collect assessments from owners who are benefitted by community 
amenities and upkeep. See, e.g., Evergreen Highlands Ass’n v. West, 73 P.3d 
1 (Colo. 2003).  
232 Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244–45 
(1968). 
233 See TREESE ET AL., supra note 42, at 3–5 (noting that common upkeep 
also allows a community to take advantage of cost savings from economies of 
scale); Ellickson, supra note 49, at 1522–23 (discussing the equitable methods 
of assessments and distribution of costs amongst property owners).  
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and owner maintenance contribution should therefore be 
considered justifiably within the substantive limits of servitude 
law.  
A modern conception of “touch and concern” could draw the 
appropriate distinction, holding that how a property is used and 
the requisite maintenance of that property—and requisite 
contribution to common property—are aspects that are 
substantively related to the real property itself.234 
Other types of community covenants and rules, however, fall 
beyond the permitted scope for governance by servitude. 
Controlling who resides in a property, for example, is not the 
same as controlling what the use of the property is.235 Occupancy 
limitations, leasing prohibitions, and transfer restrictions are not 
legitimate solutions to “commons” issues, but rather are 
unjustifiable attempts by members of a community to control their 
neighbors’ identity. Likewise, rules controlling behaviors that are 
completely contained within a home are difficult to justify on the 
basis of neighborhood externalities.236 Such covenants should be 
                                                          
234 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and 
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 770 (1986). 
235 The use of the property turns on how it is enjoyed and employed by 
the party in possession. For example, between a landlord and a tenant, it is the 
tenant’s use that defines the use to which the property is being put. Several 
courts have specifically held that renting a unit in a CIC (even short-term 
rentals) does not render the “use” of that unit “commercial” rather than 
residential. E.g., Kiekel v. Four Colonies Homes Ass’n, 162 P.3d 57 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 2007); Lowden v. Bosley, 909 A.2d 261, 266 (Md. 2006); Kaufman 
v. Fass, 756 N.Y.S.2d 247 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2003); Scott v. Walker, 645 
S.E.2d 278 (Va. 2007). Leasing and occupancy restrictions are clearly 
restraints on alienation of the right to possess, not a restriction on property 
use. A residential occupant, no matter what her race and regardless of whether 
she holds legal title or a leasehold interest, possesses and uses the property in 
the same way as another residential occupant. To the extent leasing is a use, it 
is but a use of the landlord’s investment capital. The actual use of the property 
turns on how it is enjoyed and employed by the party in possession. This 
concept is explained in greater depth in Boyack, Community Covenant 
Alienation Restraints, supra note 33. 
236 See Brower, supra note 20, at 204 (discussing the broad scope of CIC 
governing provisions, including behavior inside homes). There are in-home 
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limited by a modern substantive “touch and concern” requirement 
in servitude law. 
The best method to sort out which covenants are proper and 
which are overreaching is to adopt a twenty-first century updated 
“touch and concern” test. This test would require economic 
justification for communal governance schemes rather than 
focusing on the amorphous concept of relating to the land. If a 
given covenant acts to remediate a cost externality—such as a 
nuisance or an aspect of the “tragedy of the commons”—then 
characterizing that provision as a servitude would be justified. An 
agreement among neighbors that does not address a cost 
externality, however, should not be elevated to the status of a real 
covenant running with the land, regardless of the authors’ intent. 
Rather, such neighborhood agreements that are not economically 
justified should be mere personal contracts, analyzed and 
enforced as such. Any non-covenant provisions of a 
neighborhood agreement may (if they meet the formation 
requirements of contract law) create in personam obligations 
among the contracting parties. And the breach of these 
obligations would give rise to a claim for contract damages. But 
these terms would not run with the land nor would they be 
specifically enforceable. This approach would preserve the value 
of community covenants without allowing either the CIC 
structure or the “touch and concern” limitations on covenant-
making to unduly encroach onto residents’ autonomy.  
 
C. Solving the Constitutional Conundrum 
 
Private regulation of certain personal freedoms generates 
popular outrage.237 Courts have upheld association restrictions on 
                                                          
behaviors that may generate cost externalities. One example is smoking. See, 
e.g., Ezra, supra note 151. 
237 See DILGER, supra note 106, at 135–41; MCKENZIE, supra note 29; 
Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 883 (1988); Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take A Village? 
Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and the Demise of Community, 47 
VILL. L. REV. 553, 562 (2002); Laura Castro Trognitz, “Yes, It’s My 
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free speech,238 but public opinion backlash has been substantial. 
CIC restrictions on religious displays and practices have 
generated critical scholarship.239 And rights of persons to privacy 
and autonomy within their own homes have been fervently 
defended.240 Although “constitutional” violations are often 
asserted by discontented CIC members,241 absence of state action 
is usually fatal to such claims.242 Constitutional jurisprudence with 
respect to CICs is a bit of a mess—emotional outliers make for 
bad law—and Supreme Court precedents can be misleading.243 
This has led to disparate state law treatment of personal freedoms 
in community covenant contexts.244 The tension in the law with 
respect to constitutional freedoms and CIC functions needs to be 
resolved. 
                                                          
Castle,” 30 A.B.A. J., June 2000, at 30; Tim Vanderpool, But Isn’t This My 
Yard?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 18, 1999), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1999/0818/p2s2.html; Brian L. Weakland, 
Condominium Associations: Living Under the Due Process Shadow, 13 PEPP. 
L. REV. 297, 299 (1986).  
238 Midlake on Big Boulder Lake Condo. Ass’n v. Cappuccio, 673 A.2d 
340, 350 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that the owners “contractually agreed 
to abide by the provisions in the Declaration at the time of purchase, thereby 
relinquishing their freedom of speech concerns regarding placing signs on this 
property”).  
239 E.g., Angela C. Carmella, Religion-Free Environments in Common 
Interest Communities, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 57 (2010); Amanda Hopkins, Note, 
What’s Wrong with My Nativity Scene?: Religiously Discriminatory 
Restrictive Covenants in New York, 13 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 415 (2012). 
See also supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
240 See, e.g., Arabian, supra note 133.  
241 Hyatt, Common Interest Communities, supra note 67, at 338–39 
(discussing the tendency to claim violation of constitutional rights in CIC 
governance). 
242 See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text; see also Lisa J. 
Chadderdon, No Political Speech Allowed: Common Interest Developments, 
Homeowners Associations, and Restrictions on Free Speech, 21 J. LAND USE 
& ENVTL. L. 233, 240 (2006). 
243 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 
U.S. 501 (1946).  
244 See HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 2, at 114–55; Hyatt, Common 
Interest Communities, supra note 67, 338–42. 
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Proposed solutions to the CIC constitutional conundrum fall 
into two general categories. One approach is to treat CIC 
associations as if they were public government units, thereby 
giving residents protection through the First Amendment and 
other constitutional rights against community interference.245 This 
approach is problematic and creates worrisome precedents, as 
evidenced by the substantial judicial resistance to analogizing 
private groups to public actors.246 The second, and preferable, 
approach is a legislative solution—enact a “Bill of Rights” for 
homeowners in CICs. 
Professor Susan French was among the first to suggest a 
homeowners’ bill of rights solution to the constitutional 
governance gap in CICs.247 Professor French conceived of this 
quasi-constitutional guaranty of personal freedoms as being a 
provision included in the governing documents of the CIC.248 
                                                          
245 See, e.g., Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government, supra 
note 106; Adrienne Iwamoto Suarez, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions 
on Free Speech? First Amendment Rights in Common Interest Communities, 
40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 739 (2006). 
246 See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 516 (1976) (holding that 
private property can only be treated as if it were public “when the property has 
taken on all the attributes of a town” (emphasis in the original)); Illinois 
Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup, 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1978) (illustrating 
how difficult it is to prove that private property has “all” aspects of a town); 
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (explaining that state regulation 
alone does not constitute state action); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 
(1988) (holding that regulatory power over an entity does not render acts of 
that entity susceptible to Constitutional scrutiny); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. 
v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (same).  For discussions of the 
limits of state action application to private communities, see G. Sidney 
Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for 
Governmental Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333 (1997); Katharine 
Rosenberry, The Application of the Federal and State Constitutions to 
Condominiums, Cooperatives and Planned Developments, 19 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 1 (1984). 
247 See Susan F. French, The Constitution of a Private Residential 
Government Should Include a Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 
350 (1992). 
248 Id. 
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More recently, groups have called for state legislatures to enact a 
homeowners’ bill of rights that would apply to all CICs in the 
state.249 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws has considered including a bill of rights for 
homeowners in CICs as part of its UCIOA revision.250 State 
legislators could add great value by undertaking to identify and 
guaranty important individual rights in the context of private CIC 
governance. Statutory protection could solve the issue of to what 
extent CIC governance can be analogized to public governance. 
Creating special legislative protection for owners in CICs would 
not only address the most emotionally charged topics of CIC 
regulation (and siphon off the hard cases that make bad law) but 
would also bring clarity to the contentious issue of constitutional 
applicability to CIC governance.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Commentators and courts routinely consider the purchase of a 
home in a CIC as a conscious, voluntary choice to be bound by 
the applicable neighborhood covenants. Based on this assumption, 
CIC covenants and rules promulgated thereunder are treated 
presumptively enforceable, just like any other contract. The 
realities of home-purchasing decisions and the CIC creation 
process cast significant doubts on this approach. Although courts 
claim that in enforcing CIC covenants they are upholding 
neighborhood desires, in fact, the terms of community covenants 
may not necessarily be expressions of community preference. The 
original form of community covenants are imposed by developers 
                                                          
249 The AARP is promoting a Bill of Rights for Homeowners 
Associations. The proposed Bill of Rights includes “the right to resolve 
disputes without litigation,” the right to be informed of any changes to the 
rules, and “the right to oversight of associations and directors.” For a 
summary of the proposed bill, see A Bill of Rights for Homeowners in 
Associations, IN BRIEF (AARP Pub. Policy Inst., Washington, D.C.), July 
2006, at 1–2. 
250 See Common Interest Ownership Act, UNIFORM LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Common%20Interest%
20Ownership%20Act (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).  
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at the direction of municipalities and mortgage market actors, not 
elected by the residents themselves. Furthermore, CIC restrictive 
covenants are perpetual, mandatory, non-negotiable requirements 
of owning a home in the community. And even if buyers actually 
know, understand, and accept the content of recorded covenants 
at the time of purchase, the content of neighborhood rules may 
thereafter change in ways unforeseeable by a purchaser and 
essentially unconstrained by courts or constitutions.  Members 
can opt out of this system of private regulation—but only by 
selling their home.  
The solution to the contract-covenant disconnect is to 
recognize that recorded CC&Rs that impose neighborhood 
obligations are not, in fact, simple contracts. CIC governance is 
founded on and impacts three areas of the law: contracts, 
property, and constitutional governance. The proper judicial 
conception of CIC covenants and rulemakings, then, must draw 
upon all three of these areas by requiring a bona fide 
manifestation of assent to be bound, by appropriately limiting the 
substantive scope of neighborhood covenants, and by protecting 
homeowner rights from governmental overreaching. 
First, a higher consent threshold is vital. In the context of 
CIC covenants, the contractual temporal autonomy paradox is 
augmented. Recorded declarations are non-negotiable contracts of 
adhesion, and as such, it is unlikely that buyers—by the mere act 
of purchase alone—have truly, voluntarily consented to the 
obligations. A CIC homebuyer is not a “Ulysses,” deliberately 
choosing to be bound in order to limit future action (for his own 
benefit).251 Rather, a CIC homebuyer is bound without her 
deliberate election and is subject to terms she has no hand in 
crafting and no choice but to accept. Her supposed manifestation 
of assent is the purchase of a home, and she cannot buy that 
particular piece of property without acquiescing to the imposed 
terms.  
In other contexts, lack of buyer input with respect to adhesive 
                                                          
251 In THE ODYSSEY, Ulysses tied himself to the ship’s mast in order to 
restrain himself from reacting to the sirens’ song. See Winokur, supra note 
105, at 50 (explaining contractual obligation with reference to this metaphor).  
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contract terms is rendered less objectionable because market 
prices and market choices reflect general consumer preferences 
and values among varying options.252 But in the context of CICs, 
the lack of variation among CIC forms and the lack of non-CIC 
housing choices in several parts of the country undermine these 
market checks.253 In addition, a homebuyer usually comparison-
shops with respect to the real property and not with respect to 
associated covenant terms. Furthermore, CIC covenant terms 
may not even be made available to or reviewed by a buyer until 
closing (if at all). Providing a copy of CC&Rs only at closing 
renders homebuyer “consent” specious. At residential home 
closings, the homebuyer lacks both time and the benefit of 
counsel to assist in navigating the often lengthy and complicated 
CIC declaration, bylaws, and associated rules. Even when a 
purchaser is aware of the content of the applicable CIC covenants 
prior to closing, it is still pure fiction to claim that the owner 
manifests her “choice” to be obligated thereunder when she 
closes the home purchase. A homebuyer chooses the property and 
merely acquiesces to associated covenants, most likely without 
even knowing or understanding what these covenants require. 
Combatting lack of true homeowner assent must be 
supplemented by limitations on CIC covenant scope and 
legislative protections of homeowner rights. These protections are 
                                                          
252 While limitations on autonomy may be value-detracting, most 
theorists, courts and developers see a counterbalance in the ability of owners to 
have input into controlling the autonomy of their neighbors in turn. In 
addition, the CIC ownership structure permits shared amenity upkeep that 
makes such amenities, and perhaps homeownership in general, more 
affordable. See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 
1282 (1994) (“Notwithstanding the limitations on personal autonomy that are 
inherent in the concept of shared ownership of residential property, common 
interest developments have increased in popularity in recent years, in part 
because they generally provide a more affordable alternative to ownership of a 
single-family home.”). 
253 See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50, at 1121 (“[I]t is difficult to 
conceive of a more heavy-handed public interference in the private 
marketplace than a government rule or practice that mandates a highly 
particularized form of governance on new housing development.”). 
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necessary because (a) the homeowners are not the authors of 
community covenant content, and (b) the impact of overreaching 
covenants extends far beyond the impact of overreaching terms in 
contracts.  
Unlike most contracts, governments and government-related 
entities shape the content of CIC declarations to a far greater 
degree than do preferences of the contracting parties—here the 
neighborhood residents. To obtain zoning approval, developers 
craft CC&Rs that address municipal priorities, such as creating 
privately funded community amenities and upkeep.254 To create 
communities that will qualify for FHA insurance and GSE 
secondary market purchases, developers include provisions to 
meet enumerated underwriting criteria, such as limitations on the 
percentage of non-owner-occupants in a neighborhood.255 When 
the CC&Rs are crafted and recorded, it is the desires of these 
authorities that influence their content, not the theoretical and 
unarticulated preferences of unidentified future buyers.256 This 
fact alone argues for the implementation of some “bill of rights” 
type of protection for the parties who are thus governed.  
In addition, unlike typical contracts, CIC covenants 
presumptively exist in perpetuity.257 The durability of covenants 
makes it vital to reconsider subject matter limitations on CIC 
governance and spheres of homeowner protection. Covenants 
                                                          
254 See id. at 1112 (asserting that  “government policy aimed at load-
shedding municipal functions and services onto newly created CICs” drives the 
content of CC&Rs); see also Siegel, The Constitution and Private 
Government, supra note 106 (claiming that governments dictate CIC formation 
and content); supra notes 64, 72, 149, 151 and accompanying text (discussing 
the concept of privatization of public function).  
255 See supra notes 152–57 and accompanying text. The Restatement takes 
the position that the only permissible leasing restrictions should be those 
required by institutional lenders. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
SERVITUDES § 6.7 cmt. b (2000).  
256 Franzese & Siegel, supra note 50, at 1113; Grassmick, supra note 2, at 
212. 
257 Although some early-generation CICs and CICs in Louisiana do have 
expiration dates, most CIC covenants today continue indefinitely unless 
terminated by supermajority (sometimes unanimous) vote. See supra note 126.  
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should not be permitted to achieve in perpetuity every end that 
would be achievable among original contracting parties. To run 
with the land, a covenant should be justified by an economic 
need—the problem of incompatible uses, negative externalities, or 
free-riding, for instance. Only when covenant content supports 
the legitimate function of CIC governance should the covenant be 
enforceable as a servitude and not a mere personal contract. 
Third, in addition to mandating a higher threshold for owner 
consent and judicially limiting the scope of servitude provisions, 
states should act to protect important owner and occupant rights 
through legislation. Consent alone cannot protect future 
generations of CIC owners from being bound by the value 
judgments of today.258 For example, Professor Korngold 
explained that even though proponents of perpetually enforceable 
servitudes argue that dead hand control is rendered 
unobjectionable by adequate notice,259 “this begs the question of 
whether the deprivation of individual opportunity and autonomy 
is itself ‘fair.’”260 For example, notice of a racial segregation 
covenant would not justify its enforcement.261 Similarly, notice 
that a covenant regime exists prior to purchase of a property in a 
neighborhood should not necessarily justify the enforcement of 
private regulations that impinge on individual rights or are 
                                                          
258 Dead hand control is perhaps the “most compelling reason” that courts 
should be wary of treating freedom of contract as dispositive in determining 
servitude enforceability. Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, 
supra note 27, at 457.  
259 Susan F. French, Toward A Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving 
the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1282 (1982). 
260 Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 27, at 
457. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 (2000) 
(noting that duration of the restraint is an important consideration); Federico 
Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and 
Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and A Troubled Future, 73 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 1077, 1098 (1996) (“Generally, courts’ willingness to accept 
restrictions that limit alienability has been inversely proportional to the 
duration of the restriction.”).  
261 Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes, supra note 27, at 
457.  
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unjustifiable based on economic exigency. Notice is not 
synonymous with choice. 
Subject matter constraint is also warranted because servitudes 
are specifically enforceable; an owner cannot choose to pay 
expectation damages rather than comply.262 A breach, even 
numerous breaches, of an obligation does not terminate the 
restriction. And although a supermajority of owners can amend or 
perhaps even terminate CIC restrictions, these options are 
cumbersome and practically difficult to achieve.263 When it comes 
to CIC obligations, opting out of particular covenants is not a 
possibility and neither is exit by breach. The only way to escape 
obligations imposed by a CIC regime is to transfer ownership or 
mobilize a sufficient number of community members to vote for 
covenant revisions.264 Some CICs require near unanimity to 
change or eliminate the governance regime, and this poses a 
collective action problem that grows with the size of the subject 
community.265 
There is a clear disconnect between freedom of contract ideals 
and the realities of CIC covenant formation. Reflexive 
enforcement of CIC governing provisions based on contract 
principles perpetuates the myth of knowing consent by owners to 
                                                          
262 See supra notes 195–99 and accompanying text.  
263 See Winokur, supra note 105, at 35–37 (explaining the practical 
difficulties involved in amending CIC covenants). Several state enabling 
statutes provide that a CIC can only be dissolved through unanimous vote of 
the members. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-556 (Supp. 1964); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 183A, § 19 (Supp. 1964). 
264 CICs are plagued with participation problems that transcend even 
issues of lack of participation in democracies generally. See generally David 
C. Drewes, Note, Putting the “Community” Back in Common Interest 
Communities: A Proposal for Participation-Enhancing Procedural Review, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 314, 315 (2001); Ross Thomas, Note, Ungating Suburbia: 
Property Rights, Political Participation, and Common Interest Communities, 
22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205 (2012). 
265 See Steven A. Ramirez, The Special Interest Race to CEO Primacy 
and the End of Corporate Governance Law, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 345, 383–84 
(2007) (concluding that the collective action problem increases with group 
size); Sterk, supra note 10, at 617 (explaining the problem of holdouts and 
collective action costs in the context of CIC amendment).  
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be bound to these provisions. The reality of CIC covenant 
creation suggests that courts and legislatures should take a more 
proactive approach to protect owners from covenant overreaching 
and balancing competing public policies. True manifestation of 
knowing assent to CIC governance—covenant terms and 
governing processes—should be prerequisite to buying into a 
community. And the law should impose subject matter limitations 
on the scope of CIC governance, both through limiting what 
obligations can become servitudes and by legislatively protecting 
important individual rights.  
 
